American University Washington College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Lia Epperson

2005

True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal of
Educational Equity in the Wake of Grutter
Lia Epperson

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/lia_epperson/6/

TRUE INTEGRATION: ADVANCING BROWN'S GOAL OF
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY IN THE WAKE OF GRUTTER
Lia B. Epperson*

ITRODUCTION

The late Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, founder of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund ("LDF"), and head of the legal team that
litigated Brown v. Board of Education,' knew well the challenges that
desegregation posed in a nation founded on a system of racial subjugation and
white supremacy. A full thirty years after Brown, he acknowledged:
Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy task. Racial attitudes
ingrained in our Nation's childhood and adolescence are not quickly thrown aside in its
middle years.... In the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great
metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two cities-one white, the other black-but
it is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret. 2

Although Brown's role in ending state-mandated racial segregation in public
schools is well-known throughout this country, the story did not end with the
Supreme Court decision in 1954, nor did it end with Brown's companion case
one year later.' In truth, the promise of Brown, so revolutionary at its
inception, was frustrated at key intervals by a number of actors. Perhaps the
most significant of these was the very institution that gave it life-the
Supreme Court. As a result, although we have traveled fifty years from that
momentous ruling, we, as a nation, have had less than half that time to actively
work to achieve its covenant and ensure full equality of educational
opportunities.

*
Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law, former Director of Education,
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. I owe thanks to Michelle Adams, Richard Ford,
Benjamin Jealous, and Muriel Morisey for their generous and helpful comments on previous drafts of this
article.
1.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814-15 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (announcing that school districts must
desegregate "with all deliberate speed") [hereinafter Brown fl].
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After a rather slow start, the Supreme Court issued a series of critical
opinions that gave meaning to desegregation in education in the first two
decades after Brown. Yet in the mid- to late- 1970s, the Court issued opinions
that curtailed the financial equalization of schools and rejected metropolitan
desegregation. These decisions signaled a shift away from integrative
remedies and altered the nature of desegregation orders. The Court made it
extremely difficult for districts to achieve equality through integration, and
instead limited the options to seeking adequacy through remedial funding of
segregated schools.
Although federal court-ordered desegregation plans continued in the
South, by the 1990s a conservative Court led by Chief Justice Rehnquist
essentially relinquished its obligation to require school districts to remedy
racial segregation. The Rehnquist Court issued a trilogy of opinions that
severely limited the circumstances, means and duration of desegregation,
remedies; stated its desire to end federal court supervision; and invoked the
common mantra of restoring control to local school systems.' The lie behind
this glorification of local control is similar to the Court's embrace of "color
blindness" in many other contexts. It is a standard that treats whites and
blacks as if they were similarly situated and ignores the history of segregation
and its vestiges that have been such unique and intrinsic threads in the
American tapestry. This form of local control allowed segregation to flourish
in the era before Brown, and has done so again in the decade since these
decisions.'
Given such a troubled landscape of federal school desegregation
jurisprudence, it is not surprising that in the last thirty years, and even more
so in the last decade, there has been a powerful debate over the efficacy and
potency of the integrationist ideal as a means for increasing equality of
educational opportunity and as a tool for broad racial reform. Increasingly,
academics have mounted critiques of the Brown strategy and the failure of that
decision to fundamentally transform a nation. One such critique attacks the
integrative ideal as an effective strategy for achieving equality of educational
opportunity. 6 In the twenty-first century, however, we have a significant body

4.

Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88-103 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 486-99

(1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245-50 (1991).
5.
See infra Part B.A.
6.
See infra Part HiI.A. (discussing Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: IntegrationIdeals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) [hereinafter Bell, Two
Masters]).
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of social science research that the courts have accepted as valid7 and that
details the significant educational benefits to all students of racially integrated
systems of education.8
A related critique suggests that true racial reform is only possible when
the goal matches the interests of the dominant power structure.9 While I do
not wholeheartedly embrace this theory, hindsight does illuminate some ofthe
limits of the Brown legal strategy and implementation of desegregative
remedies. Fifty years later, it is easier to see that the strategy used and
remedies implemented were, in some ways, too simplistic to address all of the
complexities inherent in such a deeply entrenched system of racial
discrimination. To that end, I see two fundamental flaws in the contemporary
strategy and remedies used to address the violation of rights that the Court
acknowledged in Brown. The first flaw lies in the use of the integrationist
ideal as the sole legal hook on which to hang the proverbial hat. By
relinquishing a corresponding push for equalization of resources, advocates
were less able to address the deeply entrenched racial hegemony that
continued to manifest itself in poorly resourced predominantly minority
schools long after Brown. Secondly, by seeking a one-dimensional remedy
that simply eliminated dejuresegregation, advocates addressed the symptoms
of racial segregation and discrimination without actually attacking its
underlying causes. The failure to incorporate a holistic set of desegregative
measures beyond the simple racial balancing of schools allowed for a system
that, left unfettered, actually served to reinforce a system of devaluing
African-American students.
I argue that advocates should have used a two-string bow strategy, using
critical approaches that would have moved beyond the one-dimensional
strategy employed in Brown and the one-dimensional remedy sought in the
wake of the decision. The strategy should have been, and should be now, a
co-extensive fight for equality in resources and true integration. True
integration requires an end to the legal structure of apartheid plus the
institution of holistic measures to break down attitudes that linger from a
history of racial subordination. It speaks to our hope for the future and our
ideal of what our society should be. It requires instituting measures that
address what to do with students once they are housed in desegregated

7.
See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 263 F. Supp. 2d 209,234-38 (D. Mass. 2003), amended
by 283 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2003), andaffiden banc, 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-32 (2003).
8.
See infra Part IM.B.
9.
See infra Part li.A.
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schools." This includes systemic efforts to dismantle the structure of racial
subordination and white hierarchy. To create a more inclusive society,
remedies must be as complex, long-term, and broad as the problems they seek
to address. For purposes of effectuating racial reform within schools, these
measures could include curricular innovations, professional training, and nonacademic opportunities designed to increase meaningful cross-racial
interaction among students and teachers."
Acknowledging both the successes and the limits in the vision and
implementation of Brown may help advocates navigate the legal waters of the
future and promote education-oriented strategies in the twenty-first century.2
In this way, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger,
upholding race-conscious admissions policies in higher education, represents
a vehicle to use holistic integrative policies to create and maintain access to
equal educational opportunity at all levels. Beyond whatever doctrinal shift
in education law that Gruttermay portend more broadly, the context of K- 12
public education provides a particularly compelling argument for the necessity
of integrative measures. While in earlier jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has often refused to acknowledge the link between historic and current
patterns of residential and educational segregation, 3 or the impact of racial
isolation on opportunities to learn and on academic achievement, Grutter
represents the Court's most hopeful pronouncement on race in the last thirty
years.
To date, at least two appellate courts have reviewed the
constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious programs at the K-12 level in
light of Grutter,each reaching a different conclusion. I argue that advocates,
educators, and policymakers should capitalize on Grutter'spositive ruling on
race-conscious measures in education to help further voluntary race-conscious
programs at the K- 12 level that both decrease racial isolation through holistic
measures and push for equality through increased expenditures for those
schools most in need.
Part I of this paper provides a brief history of the school desegregation
litigation in the years following the Brown decision to show how the federal
courts, the very institutions that gave the most hope for an integrated society,
10. See, e.g., James Moody, Race, School Integration,andFriendshipSegregationin America, 107
AM. J. Soc. 679,713 (2001) (concluding that cross-racial integration was achieved mainly in desegregated
schools that had additional opportunities for cross-racial interaction such as extracurricular activities).
11. See infra Part IH.C.2 and note 162 (noting that very little such training was provided in the wake
of Brown). For a discussion of other examples of companion structures, see discussion infra Part [V.A.
(voluntary integration plan of Lynn, Massachusetts).
12. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
13. See infra Part I.A.
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actually hindered efforts to increase equal educational opportunities. Part H
examines the effects of these key Supreme Court school decisions on
educational opportunities and provides insights into how advocates currently
use long-standing desegregation cases to address new forms of racial
discrimination in public schools, as well as the limits to these strategies. Part
III of this paper briefly addresses one of the more popular arguments asserting
the inadequacy and futility of Brown and outlines the ways in which the onedimensional legal strategy that led to Brown and the implementation of a onedimensional remedy may have ultimately proved too simplistic to address the
complexities inherent in dismantling a system of legal apartheid in our public
schools. Part IV uses this understanding of historic imperfections to suggest
methods for effectuating equality and racial inclusion today through voluntary
race-conscious programs at the K-12 level that should be viewed even more
positively in light of Grutter,the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement
on racial inclusion in education. 4
I. THE ELUSIVE GOAL OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION

A. Massive Resistance
Nineteenth century civil rights leader Frederick Douglass said, "[P]ower
concedes nothing without demand."' 5 Nowhere was this more evident than in
the struggle to rid the public schools in the American South of the plague of
state-enforced segregation. In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown, the power structure of the South, and indeed, every level of federal
government, made few concessions in the struggle to revamp America's
divided educational institutions. Under the guise of states' rights and local
control, communities violently protested desegregation and created wellorganized and well-funded resistance movements. White Citizens' Councils,
formed by prominent Southern bankers, doctors, lawyers, state legislators, and
businessmen, exerted political and economic pressure on civil rights
advocates. In 1956, every congressman and all but three Southern senators

14. It is undisputed that the Brown legal fight was not only about providing quality educational
opportunities to African Americans, but also about the broader notion of equality in American society. For
the purposes of this piece, however, I focus on the specific impact of the opinion on the provision of
educational opportunities. This discussion also focuses on litigation under the Federal Constitution rather
than state-based litigation.
15. Frederick Douglass, 1849 Letter to an Abolitionist Associate, in ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL
CHANGE: A MANDATE FOR ACTIVITY IN THE 1990s (V.K. Bobo et al. eds., 1991).
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from the eleven states of the old Confederacy signed the "Southern
Manifesto" that pledged to overturn Brown. 16 Meanwhile, the Executive
Branch maintained public silence, while privately condemning7 the Supreme
1
Court's decision and seeming evisceration of "states' rights."'
Perhaps most damaging, the High Court itself waited a full year to
provide its directive on how to implement its ruling, and then provided only
the vaguest guidelines."8 Lower courts either interpreted Brown narrowly or
agreed to delay desegregation plans due to threats of violence. This further
empowered Southern schools to resist desegregation. 9
In Prince Edward County, Virginia, one of the five cases included in the
Brown decision,20 the school district went so far as to close public schools
altogether rather than permit desegregation. These schools remained closed
for five years.2 ' When a Virginia court declared the practice unconstitutional,
the legislature repealed compulsory education laws and made school
attendance optional. 22 The Virginia legislature then enacted one ofthe earliest
voucher programs, by allocating public monies for white students to use to
attend private schools, so as not to have to attend schools with black
children.23

16. See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS INTHE COURTS 213-17 (1994); FRED POWLEDGE, FREE
AT LAST? 139-40 (1991).

17. President Eisenhower, a steadfast believer in the "functional" motives behind the Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,548-57 (1896), doctrine of"separate but equal," privately condemned the Court's
ruling in Brown and promised Southern leaders that he would "make haste slowly." See, e.g., KENNETH
O'REILLY, NIXON'S PIANO: PRESIDENTS AND RACIAL POLmICS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 169-70

(1995). Eisenhower failed to take a position in most all of the high-profile civil rights battles that occurred
during his administration, including the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the battle to desegregate the University
of Alabama, and the lynching of fourteen-year-old Emmett Till in Money, Mississippi for allegedly
whistling at a white woman. Id. at 171-72.
18. See Brown 11, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
19. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-20(1958) (holding Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus
and the state legislature were bound to the Brown decision and must not delay implementation of a
desegregation plan). The day before a desegregated Little Rock Central High was to open, Governor Faubus
announced on television and radio that he had called out the Arkansas National Guard with directions to
block black students' entrance into the schools; Faubus maintained that if black students actually attended
school with whites, "'[b]lood [would] run in the streets."' GREENBERG, supra note 16, at 229.
20. The other districts included Topeka, Kansas; Clarendon County, South Carolina; Wilmington,
Delaware; and Washington, D.C. See generally Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
21. S. Mitra Kalita, Reflecting on Lost Opportunities;School Closings DuringMassive Resistance
Limited Black Virginians'Lives,WASH. POST, Mar. 4,2004, at B 1. This occurred in many school districts
throughout the South. In Norfolk, Virginia, for example, 10,000 white and black students were shut out of
public schools for several months in 1958. Mike Gruss & Philip Walzer, Pioneersof Progress,VIRGINIANPILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Feb. 1, 2004, at AI.
22. Kalita, supranote 21.
23. Id.
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It is no wonder then, that a full decade after the Brown decision, 98
percent of black students in Southern states still attended fully segregated
schools.24 The Southern power structure, having had few demands placed on
it by the courts, had conceded nothing, and the struggle to dismantle a system
of racial hegemony continued.25
B. Litigatingfor More Expedient Reform
Such delaying tactics by school authorities necessitated a push by civil
rights litigators to advocate for a more substantive definition of the types of
remedial measures required by Brown. While Brown I was revolutionary in
its statement that "separate but equal has no place"26 in the field of public
education, the Court essentially equivocated in Brown II, and thus failed to
offer effective guidance on how to accomplish this goal. In the absence of
clear guidance from the Supreme Court, civil rights attorneys pushed to create
a legal framework that might bring the constitutional promise of Brown to
bear on the harsh realities of racial inequities in America. In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, civil rights attorneys brought a series of cases in federal court
against individual school districts to push the Court's integration mandate.27
In 1968, some fourteen years after Brown, a unanimous Supreme Court held
that freedom-of-choice plans placed an undue burden on black schoolchildren
and were unacceptable where more expedient and effective methods of
desegregation were available.28 Delay was "no longer tolerable,"29 and the
Court imposed an "affirmative duty"30 on school districts to eliminate the

24.

ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., A MULTRACIAL

SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 17 (2003), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
25. The passage ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting discrimination in all programs receiving
federal aid, and authorizing the Department of Justice to sue on behalf of minorities if discrimination
occurred, provided the government with the enforcement powers necessary to begin a true dismantling of
the apartheid system in'American public schools. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)(6) (2000). Yet, President Nixon
consciously thwarted desegregation efforts. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 761-64 (2d ed.
2004). Nixon's campaign platform included opposition to desegregation orders; indeed, he ended this
exercise of power in 1969, leaving the duty to ensure compliance to the courts. Cf Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (observing the Executive Branch's lengthy delay in enforcing
desegregation of institutions of higher education through Title VI).
26. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 496 (1954).
27. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
28. Id.at 430.
29. Id.at 438.
30. Id.at 437.
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vestiges of discrimination "root and branch."'" The Court explicitly identified
the areas in which eliminating desegregation was of the utmost
importance-student assignment, facilities, staff assignment, faculty
assignment, extracurricular activities, and transportation.32
In 1971, the Court gave further contours to the meaning of desegregation
in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education.33 In that case, a
unanimous Supreme Court granted district courts ample freedom to fashion
remedies to desegregate schools. 34 These included court-mandated busing, the
redrawing of attendance zone lines, and the use of mathematical ratios to
ensure acceptable levels of desegregation. 35 The Court also acknowledged the
compounding effect that residential segregation had on educational
segregation.36
In 1973, almost twenty years after Brown, the Court extended the mandate
of desegregation to the North and West, where there had been no explicit
statutes requiring segregation. In Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1, Denver,
Colorado,3 7 the Court held that, in districts where school officials had
instituted segregated schools in one area, the district had an affirmative duty
to desegregate all the city's schools. The ruling also recognized Latinos' right
to desegregation.38
Cases like Swann and Keyes signaled a high point in American
jurisprudence, when federal courts actively examined remedial plans and the
scope of the courts' remedial authority to achieve integration. These cases,
decided between fourteen and twenty years after Brown, marked the zenith of
thejudiciary's exercising of its authority over the intransigent Southern power
structure. Thus, well over a decade after the court struck down state-mandated
segregation, the courts at last issued orders that forced school districts to
expediently begin the task of making real the constitutional promise of equal
protection. By defining the contours of integration in these key decisions, the
Court precipitated a steady desegregation of American schools that continued,

31. Id.at437-38.
32. Id at 435.
33. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
34. Id.at 21.
35. Id.at 22-32.
36. The Court found that planned segregation of schools led to segregated housing. Id.at 20-21.
37. 413 U.S. 189, 201-04 (1973).
38. In that same year, a federal court held that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
must issue enforcement proceedings against institutions of higher learning that failed to develop
desegregation plans in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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particularly in the South, for the next twenty years.39 True to Frederick
Douglass's words, the Southern power structure conceded only in response to
the federal court demands, which resulted in part from the continued efforts
of civil rights litigators.4"
C. The First Wave of JudicialRetreat
Unfortunately, this late-coming enforcement in the South, and brief
enforcement in the North, was quickly followed by two opinions that sharply
curtailed the expansion of desegregation to Northern metropolitan areas and
diminished the remedies available for increasing educational opportunities for
low-income minority children. In 1973, the Supreme Court, reshaped by four
Nixon appointments, severely curbed the judicial remedies available to lowincome and minority students in educationally disadvantaged schools in its
ruling in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez." In
Rodriguez, the Court held that the U.S. Constitution does not create a
fundamental right to an education and that wealth does not define protected
classes; as such, there is no requirement that schools in richer versus poorer
areas receive equal funding.42
This decision marked a retreat from Brown's commitment to equality of
educational opportunity. The Court refused to address the real issue in
Rodriguez-whether a state scheme that allowed for educational funding
disparities caused by variations in district property wealth was
unconstitutionally discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, even before Brown, the Supreme Court had
recognized that inequality in educational facilities might be a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.4 3 In Rodriguez, however, the Court minimized the
importance of financing variations to educational equity, even though, as
Justice Marshall noted, the Equal Protection Clause is meant to address just
such instances of "unjustifiable inequalities of state action."'

39.

See, e.g.,

BROWN AT 50:

GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV.,

KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? 20 (2004), available at http://www.

civilightsproject.harvard.edu/research/resegO4/brown5O.pdf. See also infra Part H.A.
40. See generally GREENBERG, supra note 16.
41. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
42. Id. at 33-40.
43. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950) (striking down state-enforced segregation
of a law school); see also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642
(1950).
44. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The next year, the Court effectively ended the expansion of desegregation
law, particularly for Northern and Western metropolitan areas, by signaling
the preeminence of local control principles. In a 5-4 vote, the Court in
Milliken v. Bradley" struck down a desegregation plan in metropolitan Detroit
and cited the importance of preserving local control of education. The Court
held that there could be no inter-district remedy absent a showing of an
intentional inter-district violation, or a showing that both urban and suburban
school districts intentionally racially discriminated against minority students."
This holding signaled a significant departure from the Court's decision in
Keyes only one year before. As in Keyes, the constitutional violation in
Milliken was the intentional segregation of the Detroit city schools. Yet,
rather than ordering "all-out desegregation," ' 7 the Supreme Court precluded
inter-district relief, which was the only route to successfully desegregating the
segregated schools in Detroit's urban core. The Court's decision to strike
down such remedies allowed white flight to flourish, thus shaping the racial
patterns of schools in metropolitan areas throughout the Northern and Western
United States. These decisions also allowed the flowers of federalism, states'
rights and local control to start to bloom again in the body politic.
In a companion case decided three years later and commonly known as
Milliken 11,48 a unanimous Court required states to fund remedial and
compensatory education programs as part of the desegregation decree. While
the push for remediation was a positive directive, the Court also relinquished
its commitment to eliminate the vestiges of racial segregation from schools
and to push for integrating student bodies. This shift away from integrative
remedies altered the nature of desegregation orders. Rather than make it
extremely difficult for districts to achieve equality through integration, it
instead limited the options to seeking adequacy through remedial funding of
segregated schools.
D. Retrenchment in 1990s Jurisprudence
Although the Supreme Court initially allowed desegregation to continue
in the South, it also began to curtail desegregation remedies there in the 1990s,
a mere twenty years after Swann. In the 1990s, a conservative Court led by

45.
46.
47.
48.

418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
Id. at 744-45.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189,214(1973).
Milliken v. Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267, 286-87 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken I1].
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Chief Justice Rehnquist 49 essentially relinquished its obligation to require
school districts to remedy racial segregation. The Rehnquist Court issued a
trilogy of opinions that severely limited the circumstances, means and duration
of desegregation remedies. While the Supreme Court had curtailed the
financial equalization of schools and rejected metropolitan desegregation in
its Rodriguez and Milliken decisions of the early 1970s, the Court also
severely hampered all desegregation remedies in the landmark decisions
Boardof Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,"° Freeman v. Pitts,5 and
Missouri v. Jenkins.52
In Dowell, the Court held that once a "unitary" system could be
established, a federal court's desegregation order should end, even if this
meant a resegregation of schools.53 The Court held that school boards need
only show they complied in "good faith" and that "the vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable." 54 As such, the
Court declared this Oklahoma school district to be unitary and lifted the
federal court order despite the fact that the district had not begun
desegregating until a full eighteen years after Brown and there was no
evidence that it would continue its efforts on a voluntary basis."5 In so doing,
the Court disavowed any accountability for persistent racial injustice.
One year later, the Court reiterated in Pitts that "[r]eturning schools to
[local control] at the earliest practicable date is essential to restore their true
accountability in our governmental system."56 To that end, the Court held that
once a district complied with a portion of a desegregation order, a federal
court should cease to monitor that portion and remain involved only as to
those aspects of the plan that have yet to be achieved. 7 This allowed for the
piecemeal dismantling of desegregation orders across the South. The Court
had failed to view the ramifications of segregated schools holistically. The
Court thus reinterpreted the six factors that it had devised in Green v. County

49. While serving as a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Jackson in 1952 and 1953, Rehnquist
authored a memo stating that he believed "Plessy v. Fergusonwas right and should be affirmed." KLUGER,
supra note 25, at 606.
50. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
51. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
52. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
53. 498 U.S. at 248-49.
54. Id. at 249-50.
55. Jd. at251.
56. 503 U.S. at 490.
57. Id. at 490-91.
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School Board" to show school districts the areas in which they should focus
desegregative efforts; instead, these factors became the markers by which a
district could make a piecemeal argument as to the "unitariness" of one
particular area. Much as Brown's message that "separate but equal has no
place" has been undermined by present-day rhetoric that the ruling intended
all programs to be color-blind, Green'smessage to desegregate in several key
areas has been subverted by the Court's incremental "unitary" status
determinations that Pitts permits.
The Rehnquist Court dealt the final coup de grace in Missouri v.
Jenkins.5 9 In an opinion that has little grounding in historical reality, the Court
established the requirement that lower courts must specify exactly what
educational deficits are traceable to segregation and discrimination, and what
results will be required as proof that the deficits are remedied.6" If such
specification is absent, Jenkins gives courts the license to return school
61
districts to local control, thus allowing documented inequities to persist.
Among other things, this opinion also released the state and local districts
from paying for remedial programs. As Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissent,
the Kansas City, Missouri, School District did not issue its first remedial order
until three decades after Brown. 62 Given such a firmly entrenched history of
racial discrimination spanning more than two centuries, 63 "to curtail
desegregation at [that] time and in [that] manner [was] ...too swift and too
64
soon."
The lie behind this glorification of local control is similar to the Court's
embracing of "color blindness" in other contexts. The standard treats whites
and blacks as if they were on equal footing and ignores the history of
segregation and its vestiges. Moreover, the Court's grim ruling surpassed the
damage caused by the curtailment of desegregative remedies in Milliken L

58.

The Court listed student assignments, facilities, staff assignments, faculty assignments,

extracurricular activities, and transportation as the most critical areas with respect to desegregation. Green
v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
59. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
60. Id. at 97-98.
61. Id.at 100-02.
62. Id.at 176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo.

1985)).
63. While the remedial programs at issue in Jenkinshad been in place for only seven years, the State
of Missouri has a long and well-documented history of racial subjugation, including slavery, slave-era
"compulsory ignorance" laws forbidding the education of blacks and state-sponsored racial segregation.
Id.at 175 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 176.
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While Milliken hindered mandatory metropolitan desegregation efforts,
Jenkins struck down a voluntary metropolitan school desegregation plan.
The opinions of the Rehnquist Court reflect a choice. The conservative
majority of the Court chose to consider the constitutional harms suffered by
minority students to be less significant than restoring the authority of local
agencies to run schools free of federal oversight. The Court reiterated its
desire to end federal court supervision and restated the common mantra of
restoring control to local school systems. This very form of local control
allowed segregation to flourish in the era before Brown, and has done so again
in the decade since these decisions.
II. CURRENT LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL LANDSCAPE

A. Result of the Court'sAbandonment of the DesegregationDoctrine
Notwithstanding the desegregative gains resulting from the jurisprudence
during the first twenty years after Brown, the Supreme Court's trio of opinions
in the 1990s thwarted this integration process. These decisions also have
made it even more challenging to address the manifold issues that have arisen
in the school desegregation context, as well as the modem mechanisms that
school districts and individuals have devised to evade court orders. In the
wake of these rulings, judges have returned cases sua sponte to court
calendars, with the expectation that the victims of the constitutional wrongs
must prove that the vestiges of the segregated system persist, or face dismissal
of the case. School districts that voluntarily sought to retain desegregation
plans became subject to lawsuits from groups who opposed such plans. This
was precisely what happened to the school district involved in the famous
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburgcase. 5 Under Dowell, school districts need
only show that they have made "good faith" attempts to remove the vestiges
of discrimination to the extent practicable,6 6 a nearly impossible standard for
plaintiffs to disprove. Local institutions need only wrap their arguments in the
guise of "good faith" to show that they should be released from court
supervision. As a result of the Court's latest desegregation rulings, if a largely
segregated school system can point to any aspect of its system that is
somewhat desegregated, or if it argues that existing segregation is the result
65. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (describing the
district's history in the desegregation context) (citing Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971)).
66. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991).
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of private housing choices rather than intentional discrimination, it may be
granted partial or complete unitary status.
In essence, efforts to hold state and local institutions accountable for the
effects of past discrimination have been hobbled by federal courts'
determinations that the "fruits" of such discrimination fall too far from the
proverbial tree-that they are too attenuated to justify race-conscious
remedies. Most importantly, and most ironically, courts have held that
racially segregated systems are theproductofprivatechoices, rather than state
action. This is especially apparent in Justice Thomas's concurrence in
Jenkins. He echoed a refrain from opinions of the nineteenth century when
he mused that only state-enforced segregation was unlawful and that defacto
segregation was neither inherently unconstitutional nor harmful to African
Americans.6 7 He noted that continued racial isolation might be the result of
voluntary housing choices and other private decisions:
[I]t is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to
counteract these social changes.... [N]eutral policies, such as local school assignments,
do not offend the Constitution when individual private choices concerning work or
residence produce schools with high black populations. The Constitution does not
prevent individuals from choosing to live together, to work together, or to send their
children to school together, so long as the State does not interfere with their choices on
the basis of race.68

The detrimental effects of Jenkins are evident in a recent decision ending
court supervision of public school desegregation efforts in the small Southern
town of Gadsden, Alabama. In Gadsden, the site of a long-standing
desegregation case,69 public schools have been slow to desegregate, in part due
to the school district's continued resistance. As an example, the district
named one middle school after the first imperial wizard of the Ku Klux Klan 0
and refused to engage in any meaningful discussions with the AfricanAmerican community about the harmful effects of sending African-American
children to a school with such a name. Yet, in 2000, a district court judge
declared the school district unitary, and found that the level of interracial
cooperation in Gadsden compared favorably with factional relations "in

67.
68.
69.

Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115-16 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.at 118, 121 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations and quotations omitted).
Miller v. Bd. of Educ., 482 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1973).
70. See, e.g., HOWARD BALL, A DEFLANT LIFE 3 (1998); JACK HURST, NATHAN BEDFORD FORREST
(1994); LYNNE OLSON, FREEDOM'S DAUGHTERS 340 (2001).
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Kosovo and Northern Ireland."'" The court further stated that the school
board cannot "require the lion to lay down with the lamb."72
This judicial philosophy evidenced in Thomas's Jenkinsconcurrence and
in the Gadsden, Alabama case is similar to the one embraced by the Court
more than a century ago, in the Civil Rights Cases73 of 1883, and in the
notorious "separate but equal" decision of Plessy v. Ferguson.74 In the Civil
Rights Cases, the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which had
outlawed racial segregation in public accommodations.75 After two centuries
of systemized racial persecution in which state and federal resources were
used to safeguard and maintain the institution of slavery, the Court determined
that the "private wrong" of racial segregation in public accommodations was
beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment: "[The Fourteenth
Amendment] does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law
for the regulation of private rights. 76 Justice Bradley further argued that:
[I]t would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act
of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain,
or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or
theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business."

Like their nineteenth century predecessors, Dowell, Pitts,andJenkins are
distanced from the real effects that racial discrimination and subordination
have on the educational opportunities of children who have historically been
denied such opportunities. In these cases, the Court also refused to
acknowledge the link between historic and current patterns of residential and

71. Miller v. Bd. of Educ., No. 63-AR-574-M, slip op. at 9-10 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2000). The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reversed this decision and remanded the case to district
court. See Miller v. Bd. of Educ., 273 F.3d 397 (1Ith Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion). The school district
remains under a revised consent decree.
72. Miller, No. 63-AR-574-M, at 9-10.
73. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
74. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). without an acknowledgment of the very recent history of slavery and
present-day realities, the Court disregarded the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical
differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present
situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other
civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United
States cannot put them upon the same plane.
Id.at 551-52.
75.

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26.

76. Id.at I1.
77. Id at 24-25.
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educational segregation,78 or the impact of racial isolation on opportunities to
learn and on academic achievement.
B. Resegregation ofAmerica's PublicSchools
These attacks on efforts to desegregate have resulted in the welldocumented "resegregation" of school districts. American public schools
have been steadily resegregating for more than a decade,79 dismantling the
integrative successes of hundreds of districts that experienced significant
levels of integration in the wake of Brown and its progeny."0 Racial isolation
in public schools is worse today than at any time in the last thirty years.8 '
Almost all of the nation's largest urban school districts are overwhelmingly
nonwhite. 2 These nonwhite schools educate one-sixth of the nation's
African-American students and one-quarter of its Latino students.8 3 Yet, the
most segregated of all students are white students.84
Educators and advocates litigating school desegregation cases today are
aware that the statistics detailing school resegregation portend much more
than a racial balkanization of schools at a superficial level. Beneath these
statistics, the reality is that a disproportionate number of the schools in which
black and brown children are educated also host ills that impede positive
learning. As the old saying goes, "green follows white." The public schools
that house the highest percentages of African-American and Latino students
are also those that have concentrations of enormous poverty 5 and very limited
resources. In 2000, nearly 90 percent of intensely segregated AfricanAmerican and Latino schools had more than half of their students on free or
78. See, e.g., Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential
Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795 (1996); Marc Seitles, The Perpetuationof
ResidentialRacial Segregationin America: HistoricalDiscrimination,Modern Forms ofExclusion, and

InclusionaryRemedies, 14 J. LAND USE & ENV. LAw 89, 123 (1996).
79. See, e.g., ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 39, at 2-4.
80. During the period from 1964 to 1970 when the judiciary and the executive agencies actively
enforced desegregation the percentage of African-American students in white schools increased more than
fourteen-fold in six years. Id. at 18. Indeed, from 1964 to 1974, the percentage of African-American
students attending previously all-white schools increased from 2.3 percent to 36 percent. Id. at 19. Over
the next eighteen years, the increase in the number of African-American students in white schools was
approximately 33 percent. Id.
81.

See, e.g., FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 24, at 4-5.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. On average, white students attend schools where 80 percent of the student body is white. Id.
85. Roughly one-third of African Americans live in poverty, compared to less than 10 percent of
whites. JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY INTHE UNITED STATES, 2000, at 4 (2001).
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reduced lunch.86 Conversely, 96 percent of white students are educated in
schools with middle-class majorities.8 7 For those white students, the
socioeconomic realities translate into better facilities, more computers, more
experienced teachers, and a more diversified curriculum. For many students
of color, this "green follows white" phenomenon may literally mean the
difference between attending a four-year college and entering a lucrative
profession, and dropping out of high school with little hope of stable
employment. While there have been arguments that the proper solution
should have been and should be to attack economic segregation in schools
rather than attacking racial segregation per se,88 such strategies for equity in
expenditures, without a corresponding push for racial integration, could not
have yielded the short- and long-term educational benefits of past
desegregation efforts and those that remain in place today.89
C. Insights on CurrentSchool DesegregationLitigation
While many school districts are prematurely phasing out desegregation
plans as a result of the Court's recent rulings, schools today also manifest new
forms of racial inequity that have roots in the historic systems of school
segregation. There has been a metamorphosis in the way racial discrimination
has expressed itself in public education. This metamorphosis illustrates that
the underlying inequality that informed racial separation in schools
historically remains an undeniable facet in public education today. While

86. FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 24, at 35.
87. Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation,inDISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 53 (Gary Orfield
et al. eds., 1996). The complex factors that have contributed to the crippling racial and spatial isolation of
African Americans is rooted in this country's history of federal, state, local and private discriminatory
housing and lending policies, and the continued effects of such policies. See, e.g., ARNOLD R. HIRSCH,
MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960, at 254-55 (2d ed. 1998);
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 196-218

(1985); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993); Melvin L. Oliver &
Thomas M. Shapiro, Wealth andRacial Stratification,in 2 AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND
THEIR CONSEQUENCES 241 (Neil Smelser et al. eds., 2001); Glenda G. Sloane, Creative Financingand
Discrimination: Discriminationin Home Mortgage Financing,in A SHELTERED CRISIS: THE STATE OF
FAIR HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES 83 (U.S. Civil Rights Comm'n ed. 1983); Leland Ware & Antoine Allen,
The Geography ofDiscrimination:Hypersegregation,Isolation,and FragmentationWithin the AfricanAmerican Community, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 2002, at 69 (Lee A. Daniels ed., 2002).
88. See infra Part I.A. See also Milliken 11,433 U.S. 267,280-81,288-90 (1977) (requiring states
to fund remedial and compensatory education programs in lieu of inter-district integrative remedies)
(discussed supra Part l.B.); RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION (1996).
89.

See infra Part Il.
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earlier advocates addressed the symptoms of segregation, the underlying
causes of segregation continued to fester.
Over the years, court-ordered desegregation cases have shifted from
efforts to eliminate the legal structure of apartheid in public .schools to
litigation to equalize resources between schools with largely segregated
student bodies, as was the case in Milliken II, or to address in-school racial
segregation that manifested in areas such as special education classes and in
discipline referrals. Such issues are a direct result of the failure to fully
desegregate schools in the wake of Brown, as well as the perpetuation of
practices within schools that allowed racial hierarchical systems to continue
to flourish.
Today, advocates use traditional desegregation cases to address many of
the new forms of racial inequity that are vestiges of historical racial
segregation and discrimination in public schools. A number of such cases
remain active in federal courts throughout the South and provide some of the
only constitutional tools to address a host of damaging issues. Ironically, the
language of Brown assumed schools were effectively equal: "[T]here are
findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been
equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula,
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible factors."' 9 Yet,
such equalization has remained elusive: Indeed, traditional desegregation
cases are often used today as vehicles for the Plessy-like equalization of
facilities, curricula, and other "tangible factors" plaguing school districts
where integration has been effectively abandoned.
By obtaining and preserving consent decrees in school districts, advocates
have affected the holistic education of children in public schools by, among
other things, helping to create magnet programs, addressing racial disparities
in the identification of special education students, 91 tackling the
disproportionate disciplining of students of color, spurring new school
construction, and improving the hiring and retention of African-American
teachers and staff. In turn, these decrees help to diminish the effects of
segregation, deconcentrate poverty, and improve the quality of learning for

90. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
91. When Congress passed amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act
("IDEA") in 1997, it found that students of color were statistically 2.3 times more likely to be identified
as having special needs than their white counterparts. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Amendments of 1997 § 101 (c)(8Xc), Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997); see also RACIALINEQUALITY
INSPECIAL EDUCATION (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002) (discussing overidentification of racial
minorities in special education).
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some children of color. In Alabama, for example, a recent statewide decree
requires that the State address the vestiges of racial segregation that exist in
the special education context.92 Such desegregation decrees provide a vehicle
to address some of the racial disparities that continue to plague students in
these schools. Thus, while current litigation is limited by the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, existing court-ordered desegregation plans can still have
concrete positive effects.
In addition to mandatory desegregation plans, other school districts have
voluntarily instituted desegregation programs in public schools throughout the
country, which use race as one of many factors in creating holistic educational
programs. Such approaches circumvent some of the Supreme Court's
limitations on court-ordered plans. Voluntary measures can help to reduce
racial isolation both within schools and between districts. In Massachusetts,
South Carolina, Kentucky, and California, advocates have successfully
defended policies in which school districts have voluntarily considered the
racial diversity of student bodies in determining where to build new schools,
how to draw attendance zone lines, and how to fashion student transfer
policies.93 When properly implemented, such policies can marry true racial
integration with increased financial capital to provide improved racial and
economic diversity within public education.'
I. REFLECTIONS ON BROWN

Fundamentally, the age-old debate about racial integration has never been
simply about white students and students of color learning in the same
classroom; by virtue of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence limiting other
avenues for relief, integration has also been one of the only legal tools
available to address overall concentrations of poverty and severe racial
isolation, which hamper children's opportunities to learn. As Justice Marshall

92. Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 963 F. Supp. 1122, 1124 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (holding the
Alabama State Board of Education and state superintendents responsible for maintaining dual system of
education and requiring them to remove those vestiges). The parties entered into a statewide consent decree
in the case in September 2000, which requires removing the vestiges of racial discrimination in provision
procedures for identifying and placing students in special education in the State of Alabama, See Marilyn
Milloy, Truth in Labeling, NEA TODAY, Jan. 2003, at http://www.nea.org/neatoday/0301/cover.html
(discussing some early successes of reforms instituted under the Lee v. Lee County Board of Education
special education decree).
93. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 263 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Mass. 2003); see infra Part
IV (discussing the merits of voluntary race-conscious programs in public education).
94. See infra Part IV.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:175

stated, our standard for addressing inequality in education should be rooting
out "[d]iscrimination in the opportunity to learn that is afforded a child."95 By
providing increased access to quality education, schools may literally serve as
the determinative factor of a child's success. The Court in Brown noted this
when it stated that "education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments .... [and] is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment."96
In the last thirty years, and increasingly so in the last decade, there has
been a powerful debate over the efficacy and potency of the integrationist
ideal as a means for increasing equality of educational opportunity and as a
tool for broad racial reform. Although in the court of public opinion, Brown
represents one of the most important Supreme Court decisions of the last
century, there has been a mounting academic critique97 of the Brown strategy
and the failure of that decision to fundamentally transform a nation. One such
critique attacks the integrative ideal as an effective strategy for achieving
equality of educational opportunity.9 8 A related critique suggests that true
racial reform is only possible when the goal matches the interests of the
dominant power structure. 99 While I do not wholeheartedly subscribe to these
theories, I do think hindsight affords us the ability to see some of the limits of
the Brown legal strategy and implementation of desegregative remedies more
clearly. In this section, I examine some of the more popular critiques of the
integrationist strategy and argue that advocates in Brown utilized a onedimensional strategy-attacking racial segregation without a corresponding
attack on unequal resources-and a one-dimensional remedy-focusing on the
elimination of dejure segregation without additional measures to address the
underlying causes of racial hegemony. I argue that this strategy and resulting
remedy has hindered the progress of racial inclusion and equality of
educational opportunity, and suggest that the fight should have focused on
achieving both true integration and equality of resources.

95.
96.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 84 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.

97.

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND

THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 468 (2004); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the
Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown is Dead! Long Live
Brown!: The Endless Attempt to Canonize a Case, 80 VA. L. REV. 161 (1994); Mark Tushnet, The
Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173 (1994).
98. See infra Part M.A.
99. Id.
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A. The Futility of the IntegrationistStrategy and the Role of "InterestConvergence"
There are a number of legal scholars who have discussed the ways in
which the much-lauded Brown decision was, in the end, a wasted effort.
Perhaps the best known of these critiques is the one espoused by Professor
Derrick Bell nearly thirty years ago in his oft-cited article, Serving Two
Masters.'0 Bell has argued that the goal of Brown should not have been racial
integration of public education. Rather, he argued that his "behind-the-scenes
view" as a civil rights attorney with the Legal Defense Fund revealed that the
much-lauded integrationist ideal often failed to directly address clients'
interests.'
Moreover, Professor Bell argued that the legal strategy of
desegregation did not provide clients with lasting remedies.' 12 Since,
according to Bell, integration is a lofty and unattainable ideal that is often out
of synch with the actual interests of African-American clients in desegregation
cases,0 3 the legal strategy should have instead focused on education-oriented
strategies, apart from a discussion of race.
Later, Bell expounded upon this theory in his discussion of the "interestconvergence" theory"° and in his recent book on the "unfulfilled hopes for
racial reform."'0 5 According to his interest-convergence theory, racial
progress only comes when the interests of the white power structure converge
with the stated goal to produce the desired result. 06 Bell argues that
"policymakers recognize and act to remedy racial injustices when, and only
when, they perceive that such action will benefit the nation's interests without
significantly diminishing. whites' sense of entitlement."'0 7 As such, racial
justice only arrives "on the wings of racial fortuity rather than hard-earned
entitlement. Its departure, when conditions change, is preordained."' 8
Such critiques of Brown and its integrationist legal strategy may be rooted
in the sentiment of significant numbers of the black population during the era
pre-dating Brown. There are members ofthe black populace who vociferously

100.

Bell, Two Masters, supra note 6.
101. See id.at 471.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARv.
L. REV. 518 (1980).
105. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS 49-58 (2004) [hereinafter BELL, COVENANTS].

106. Id.
107. Id.at 9.
108. Id.
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advocated for a more measured approach, felt that a frontal attack on
segregation was too rash, and well understood that such measures would
realistically be ineffective as means to bring immediate educational
improvements to black children. As Professor Bell has argued, the black and
civil rights lawyers who argued fervently for integration were part of a social
elite who stood to gain more than the average black American from a policy
of integration.0 9 Yet, current critiques of the Legal Defense Fund strategy are
too easily dismissive of a set of legal tactics that, while imperfect, have
yielded and continue to yield substantial, long-term, transformative results.
Indeed, Brown undoubtedly conveyed a powerful message of equality to many
African Americans throughout the nation, as is evidenced by the welldocumented reactions to the decision."'
Importantly, these critiques fail to examine some of the real challenges
that were inherent in advocating for educational opportunities for AfricanAmerican children in an era when our country still sanctioned an apartheid
regime in the South. While Bell suggests that the strategy of racial integration
was imprudent at best, it is essential to understand that without such a
strategy, it may have been nearly impossible to push for effective educationoriented strategies in a world where African Americans' movements were so
proscribed. The Supreme Court was the sole institution that could have
effectively issued the clarion call that Plessy's "separate-but-equal" rule was
no longer the law of the land. If the "social engineers" of Charles Hamilton
Houston's vision"' had not advocated for equal justice under the law for all
Americans by promoting racial integration and enlisting the law in that cause,
we would likely not have the successes of today in the fields of medicine, law,
business, and education." 2

109. Bell, Two Masters, supra note 6, at 489-92 (noting that, in the short run, it may have been the
black elites who stood to gain the most immediate benefits from breaking down the doors of state-sponsored
segregation).
110. As Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King stated, for millions of people, the decision "served to
transform the fatigue of despair into the buoyancy of hope." Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., The
Rising Tide ofRacial Consciousness, in I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD 63,65 (James M. Washington ed., 1992); see also LYNNE OLSON, FREEDOM'S DAUGHTERS: THE
UNSUNG HEROES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM 1830 TO 1970 (2001); POWLEDGE, supra note

16, at 57 (noting that the Brown decision was one of the critical events that gave the civil rights movement
irreversible momentum).
I 11. Charles Hamilton Houston, noted lawyer, Howard Law School professor, and architect of the
legal strategy behind Brown, espoused a philosophy of "social engineering," which argued that the law
could be used as a tool for fundamental social change. Seegenerally GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK:
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983).
112. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 25, at 781-82.
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B. The Value of Racially IntegratedSchools
The most effective refutation of the critiques mounted by Bell and others
is the substantial body of social science research, which courts have accepted
as valid, that details the significant short- and long-term educational benefits
of racially integrated systems." 3 Substantial desegregation of students did not
begin until fully seventeen years after the Court's decision in Brown-with
Green and Swann. The most effective period of school desegregation took
place from approximately 1970 until 1990,' when Dowell and its progeny
prompted a rollback of desegregative gains. During that time, AfricanAmerican students experienced a significant rise in academic achievement.
In the 1950s, less than 50 percent of young African-American adults had a
high school diploma or a GED." 5 By 1993, the rate had increased to 83
percent, which was close to the completion rate of whites." 6 By the late
1980s, the graduation rate for African Americans surpassed the national
secondary completion rates for most European societies." 7
Likewise, the so-called "achievement gap" between African-American
and white students decreased considerably. Reading, math, and science scores

113. See, e.g., ELLIOT ARONSON & SHELLEY PATNOE, THE JIGSAW CLASSROOM:

BUILDING

COOPERATION INTHE CLASSROOM (2d ed. 1997); JANET WARD SCHOFIELD, BLACK AND WHITE INSCHOOL:
TRUST, TENSION, OR TOLERANCE? (1982); AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., How DESEGREGATION CHANGED
Us: THE EFFECTS OF RACIALLY MIXED SCHOOLS ON STUDENTS AND SOCIETY (2004), available at
httpJ/cms.tc.columbia.edu/i/a/782_ASWells041504.pdf; Christopher Ellison & Daniel A. Powers, The
ContactHypothesis and RacialAttitudes Among Black Americans, 75 SOC. SCI. Q. 385 (1994).
114. JOHN R. LOGAN & DEIRDRE OAKLEY, LEWIS MUMFORD (TR. FOR COMPARATIVE URBAN AND
REG'L RESEARCH, STATE UNIV. OFN.Y. AT ALBANY, THE CONTINUING LEGACY OF THE BROWN DECISION:
COURT ACTION AND SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1960-2000, at 2 (2004), available at http://
mumford.cas.albany.edu/schoolsegregation/reports/Brown-report_
28.doc. As of 2000, 75 percent of
African-American students in the South and 62 percent of African-American students in the rest of the
country were attending schools in districts that were under mandatory desegregation decrees at some time
between 1950 and 1964. Id.
115. Gary Orfield, Unexpected Costs and Uncertain Gains of Dismantling Desegregation, in
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 85 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996).

116. Id.
117. Id. at 73, 85. One example of such change includes the St. Louis desegregation case. Liddell
v. Bd. of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. Mo. 1983). There, a settlement resulted in voluntary
desegregation measures that allowed several thousand black inner-city youth to enroll in predominantly
white systems in the suburbs. While the majority of transfer students were low-income, they completed
high school at approximately twice the rate of their counterparts in racially isolated city schools and
attended college at a rate three times above the national average for black high school graduates. AMY
STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN, STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS

IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 198-99 (1997).
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of elementary and secondary students improved between 1971 and the
1980s.l ' Since school desegregation policies were widely implemented in the
late 1960s, the test score gap between African-American students and white
students has decreased by almost 50 percent." 9 This gap closed markedly,
despite the fact that many lower-achieving African-American students who
would have previously dropped out of school remained in the system.
Moreover, scores for African-American students improved even though the
incidence of poorer, single-parent families and unemployment were on the
rise. 0 At least one study has found that while positive family changes such
as improved parental education accounted for less than 25 percent of the
reduction in the test score gap, significant changes in African-American
educational opportunities brought by desegregation, the war on poverty
programs, and affirmative action were most likely more related to the
improvement. 12 1 In addition, the largest changes in the test score gap occurred
in the Southeast, which had experienced the highest levels of desegregation
and had the largest number of districts under mandatory desegregation
decrees. 122 African-American gains were the lowest in the Northeast, which
experienced the least amount of desegregation 123 due to the Court's ruling in
Milliken, striking down mandatory inter-district desegregative remedies absent
a showing of intent. In addition to the statistical evidence showing that
desegregated schools lead to higher graduation rates and test scores, studies
show that African-American children attending desegregated schools are more
likely to enroll in and graduate from four-year colleges24 and to major in
subjects that lead to more lucrative jobs and professions.1

118. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATISTICS, STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE

EDUCATION OF BLACKS 48-52 (2003). Science scores for African Americans appear to have remained
constant beginning in the early 1990s. Id. at 52. The gap between African-American and white students'
reading scores has widened moderately beginning in the late 1980s until 1999. Id. at 48. There is some
evidence to suggest that the leveling off of gains in closing the test score gap might be a result of the
leveling offofprevious desegregative gains. See, e.g., FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 24, at 4-5 (citing
Eric Hanushek et al., New Evidence about Brown v. Board of Education: The Complex Effects ofSchool
Racial Composition on Achievement (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8741, 2002).
119. WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 117, at 340.
120. ORFIELD, supra note 115, at 86.
121. David Grissmer, Ann Flanagan & Stephanie Williamson, Why Did the Black-White Score Gap
Narrow in the 1970s and1980s?, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 182, 199-200, 221 (Christopher
Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998).
122. LOGAN & OAKLEY, supra note 114, at 2.
123. Id.
124. James McPartland & Jomills Braddock, Going to College andGettinga GoodJob: The Impact
ofDesegregation,in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: EQUITY, QUALITY, AND FEASIBILITY 141 (Willis
D. Hawley ed., 1981).
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Perhaps most importantly, data also suggests that there are long-term
benefits for students who attend racially integrated schools. Beginning in the
1980s and early 1990s, as the long-term effects of desegregation plans
implemented in the late 1960s and early 1970s became more apparent, a
growing body of literature detailed the long-range benefits of desegregation
in America's public schools.125 As sociologists Amy Stuart Wells and Robert
Crain have found, desegregation policies have provided African-American
students with access to high-status institutions and the powerful social
networks that grow out of those institutions. 2 6 Yet, African-American
children are not the only long-term beneficiaries of integrated schools.
Studies have shown that desegregative policies benefit children of all races.
Meaningful interaction between students from racially diverse backgrounds
leads to an increased sense of civic engagement and increases the likelihood
that such students will grow up socializing across racial boundaries and
discussing racial matters. 7 These benefits include greater toleration of, and
appreciation for, members of other racial backgrounds, a greater sense of civic
and political engagement, and an increased desire to live and work in
12
multiracial settings as adults. 1
Even in the face of formidable challenges to the use of court-ordered
desegregative remedies, more than seventy-five active school desegregation
and education cases remain. 29 The experience of active school desegregation
litigators is that such cases have provided, and continue to provide, academic
and social benefits for all children in school districts. 3
In the latest
generation of school desegregation cases, desegregative policies have been
employed to advocate for the construction of better schools, for curricular
advancements, and to address a host of racial disparities in school discipline

125. See, e.g., id.at 141-44.
126. Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain,PerpetuationTheory andtheLong-Term Effects ofSchool
Desegregation,64 REV. EDUC. RES. 531-35 (1994).
127. See, e.g., WILLiAmG. BOwEN&DEREKBOK, THE SHAPEOFTHERIVER 232 (1998); SCHOFIELD,
supra note 113; WELLS ET AL., supra note 113, at 14-15; Mitchell J. Chang, The Positive Educational
Effects of RacialDiversity on Campus, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED 175, 183 (Gary Orfield & Michal
Kurlaendereds., 2001). Even the Rehnquist Court, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,648-49 (1993), noted that
our Constitution encourages us to weld together various racial and ethnic communities, and to avoid racial
balkanization. See also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995).
128. See Janet Ward Schofield, School DesegregationandIntergroup Relations: A Review of the
Literature, 17 REV. EDUC. RES. 335, 335-409 (1991); Lee Sigelman & Susan Welch, The Contact
HypothesisRevisited.- Black- White InteractionandPositiveRacialA ttitudes, 71 SOC. FORCES 781(1993);
WELLS ET AL., supra note 113, at 15-18.
129. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FuND CASE DOCKET ii (Apr. 2004).
130. This is consistent with impressions drawn from former colleagues.
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and in special education. 3 Furthermore, notwithstanding Bell's arguments
about the divergence between litigation strategies and client interests, current
litigation efforts may be the only viable way of addressing clients' interests,
even if there is disagreement as to some of the specific aspects of relief.'3 2
While an imperfect solution, these cases provide one of the only means by
which plaintiffs can hold districts constitutionally responsible for proactively
working to remove the vestiges of a history of racial subordination and
segregation from public schools. Indeed, such cases arguably have provided
remedies on a district-by-district basis' 33 that have proved elusive in other
such as cases brought under the education
forms of school litigation to date,
13 4
clauses of state constitutions.
C. The Benefit of Hindsight
Nonetheless, we are at a critical point in the evaluation of the use of
traditional strategies for attacking segregation per se. Critiques of the
integrationist ideal and of the forces that led to a dismantling of statesanctioned segregation in America's public schools are not without merit.
With the benefit of a half-century of hindsight, the limits in the vision of
Brown and the failure to fully implement effective civil rights remedies are
more clear. Fifty years later, it is easier to see that the strategy used and the
remedies implemented were, in some ways, too simplistic to address all of the
complexities inherent in such a deeply entrenched system of racial
discrimination. While the limits in the vision and implementation of Brown
do not negate the very real gains we have witnessed as a result of the Court's
ruling, acknowledging them may help advocates navigate the current legal
climate and develop education-oriented strategies in the twenty-first century.
I argue that any effective future litigation strategy should move beyond the

131. See supra Part II.C.
132. This is consistent with feedback received from my former clients and clients of former
colleagues in other desegregation cases.
133. See supraPart ll.C. (discussing successes of second-generation school desegregation litigation).
134. While such school finance cases may be successful at the liability phase, slow-moving state
legislatures often hamper remedial implementation. See Michael A. Rebell, Education Adequacy,
Democracy, and the Courts 240, in ACHIEVING HIGH STANDARDS OF JUSTICE FOR ALL: CONFERENCE
(2002), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/resourcecenter/research/
SUMMARY
adequacychapter.pdf (discussing challenges in remedial phases of school finance litigation). Moreover,
with the exception ofSheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1281 (Conn. 1996), the definitions of adequacy used
by the state courts do not reference race or a requirement for racial integration.
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one-dimensional approach employed in Brown and the one-dimensional
remedy sought in the wake of that decision.
1. The Limits of a One-DimensionalStrategy
The flaw in the strategy of Brown lies in the use of the integrationist ideal
as the sole legal hook on which to hang the proverbial hat. While scholars like
Bell suggest that the integrationist strategy itself was misguided, this supposes
that legal tacticians were faced with an either/or situation-lawyers may either
fight for the dismantling of a system of legal apartheid in American public
schools or they may advocate for the equalization of physical facilities, books,
and curricular offerings, but not both. Indeed, in the earlier stages of the
Brown litigation, strategists actually did use a "two-string bow" strategy.'
Professor Jack Greenberg, one of the lawyers who litigated the Brown cases,
noted that there was tension among Legal Defense Fund lawyers regarding the
decision to mount a frontal attack on segregation without a corresponding
attack on unequal facilities and expenditures. According to Greenberg, some
lawyers viewed a parallel strategy as potentially ineffectual, "cowardly[,] and
unprincipled," while others, including Thurgood Marshall, "[u]p to the very
end.., wanted to give judges an opportunity to rule with us on the basis of
physical inequalities."' 3 6 Eventually, Marshall decided to drop the
equalization strategy and attack segregation per se. In the period before the
high Court's ruling, however, Marshall reportedly had second thoughts about
this strategic decision. 3 '
Ultimately, the Brown Court found that the segregated schools involved
"ha[d] been or [we]re being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula,
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors."'3 By
admitting that separate schools were being equalized, lawyers lost the ability
to incorporate equalization as a fundamental strain within Brown's
integrationist mandate. In so doing, it became increasingly difficult to talk
about integration and equalization as equally critical parts of the goal of
increasing educational opportunities for African-American children. As a
consequence, desegregative remedies focused more on the literal

135. KLUGER, supra note 25, at 293 (discussing the Brown legal team's decision to "hedge on the
strategy" by arguing that "black public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment because they were (1)
demonstrably unequal to and (2) separate from white schools in the community").
136. GREENBERG, supra note 16, at 86.
137. KLUGER, supra note 25, at 293.
138. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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desegregation of schools and classrooms, and less on the equalization that
remained elusive.
Fifty years after the Court's ruling regarding segregation, however, it is
painfully apparent that the elimination of the legal structure of racial
segregation has not been the panacea that many hoped it would be. Even in
the ongoing struggle to achieve the true integrative ideal that many believed
to be the spirit of the law as set forth in Brown, the fundamental reality has
been that the tactic of relying exclusively on desegregating schools as the
strategy for effectuating equality of educational opportunity has faltered
without a corresponding focus on equalization. The current landscape with
respect to educational opportunities has proven that equality of resources is
equally critical to the success of many integration strategies.
The reality of educational opportunities in the twenty-first century falls
far short of the ideals set forth in Brown. In their failure to continue to
advocate for increased expenditures, improved physical resources, and better
curricular offerings in majority black schools while desegregative remedies
were being implemented, lawyers missed a vital opportunity to directly
address the realities of the entrenched racial hegemony while still seeking the
ideal of integrated public education. The strategy should have been, and
should be today, a dual strategy of seeking both true integration139 and equality
of resources. 40 As a strategy, the two-string bow of integration and
equalization may have yielded more effective results, and also may have
preempted the attacks on the integrationist ideal that developed in the wake
of the decision. 4 Hindsight has shown that the law is not singularly
transformative, particularly in the face of deeply entrenched racial inequities.

139. See discussion infra Part Ill.C.2. Professor John Powell has also discussed the concept of true
integration. See, e.g., John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Brown is Not Brown and Educational
Reform is Not Reform ifIntegrationIs Not a Goal, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343 (2003); John
A. Powell, The Tensions Between IntegrationandSchool Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655 (2001);
John A. Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housingand Education,80 MINN. L. REv. 749 (1996).
140. An argument could also be made that such equalization of resources across schools may, in fact,
require more significant expenditures to be allocated toward predominantly minority schools that often have
high concentrations of poverty. Since schools that house students with little resources are often more
expensive to operate, such schools need even greater resources than do middle- and upper-middle-class
schools. See, e.g., James Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999).
141. As noted earlier, see discussion supra Part Ill.A, the attacks on the integrationist ideal came
about in part over the frustration of the failure of the integrationist strategy to yield sufficiently
transformative results in the field of educational opportunities. Yet, if a dual strategy had been employed,
the fundamental struggle for integration could have continued alongside, rather than in lieu of, a push for
direct attention to the expenditures that would have more immediately addressed the needs of children in
the face of the challenges to integration that ensued.
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The vestiges of this nation's history of racial subordination are particularly
evident in the persistent residential segregation and concentrations of poverty
that plague African Americans. In the face of such segregation and poverty,
policies that addressed equalization of expenditures and curricular offerings
at predominantly black schools would have helped to increase educational
opportunities while addressing the realities of the day.
Larger systemic racial inequities still affect the provision of quality
education in our nation. Perhaps the most egregious of these inequities is the
persistent concentration of poverty and resulting residential segregation that
continues to plague our nation. Since sociologist Gunnar Myrdal's critique
of the "American Dilemma" of racial discrimination, 142 social scientists have
documented the interrelation between concentrations of poverty, segregation,
and racial inequality. 143 African Americans, in particular, are the most
segregated group in America, even more so than poor whites.'" This pattern
of segregation holds even for more affluent blacks, 145 which suggests that
class-based remedies alone will not eradicate inequities. The effects of46
governmental and private housing discrimination are still manifesting today. 1
Given that the courts-save for a brief moment in time 147 have been largely
unwilling to acknowledge the relationship between4these factors, equalization
efforts remain an imperative companion remedy. 1

142. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 77 (Pantheon Books 1996) (1944).
143. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supranote 87.
144. See, e.g., JOHN ICELAND ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACIAL AND ETHNIC SEGREGATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: 1980-2000, at 3-4 (2002); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 87, at 84-87; MARY
PATILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES 27 (1999); Douglas S. Massey & Mary J. Fischer, Does Rising
Income Bring Integration?New Resultsfor Blacks, Hispanics,andAsiansin 1990,28 SoC. SCI. RES. 316,
317 (1999) (noting that African-Americans "continue to lag well behind other groups in achieving
integration, irrespective of social class"); MARY PATILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES 27 (1999).
145. See, e.g., Richard D. Alba et al., How Segregatedare Middle-ClassAfrican Americans?, 47
SOC. PROBS. 543, 556 (2000) (noting that the communities in which African Americans reside have less
affluence and more crime than the communities where whites with similar personal and household
characteristics are found); Massey & Fischer, supra note 144, at 317.
146. See CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV. & LEWIS MUMFORD CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE
URBAN & REG'L RESEARCH, STATE UNIV. OFN.Y. AT ALBANY, HOUSING SEGREGATION: CAUSES, EFFECTS,
AND POSSIBLE CURES 2-4 (Apr. 3, 2001) (noting that fears of the "black ghetto" contribute to racial
discrimination and flight from integrated neighborhoods); Denton, supra note 78, at 795, 801-06.
147. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Pernick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 n.13 (1979) (noting that "school
segregation is a contributing cause of housing segregation"); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (noting that planned segregation of schools led to segregated housing).
148. Efforts to increase expenditures, however, without the corresponding attention to eradicating
the underlying causes of racial discrimination and segregation, also miss the point. The failure of the
remedies ordered in Milliken II, for example, illustrates that a singular focus on increasing expenditures to
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The failure of the traditional desegregation strategy to incorporate a
corresponding push for equality of resources means that advocates today must
still fight for that elusive equality in educational opportunity.' 49 In many of
the cases with court-ordered desegregation decrees today, advocates fight for
Plessy-like equalization of resources as a direct result of the failure to do so
in the past. The underlying inequality that informed racial separation prior to
Brown continues to plague the nation's schools, but is manifested in other
ways. Consequently, while advocates strive to decrease racial isolation in all
schools, racial inequality continues to manifest in unequal physical
expenditures allotted to schools in the predominantly black neighborhoods. 50
In these cases, advocates use the court-ordered desegregation decrees to
address racial disparities in resource allocation and curricular offerings. It
could be argued that the triumph of traditional court-ordered desegregation
plans is that advocates actually have a constitutional hook at their disposal
with which to fight for such "equalizing" remedies. Yet, the tragedy is that if
there had been a corresponding effort to include a focus on the equalization
efforts along with integration in the strategy leading to the Court's decision
in 1954, advocates might be much further along in addressing some of the
tangible results of historical and current segregation that continue to plague
public schools.
The failure of the singular focus on attacking segregation proves that the
formal neutrality of a policy simply eliminating dejure segregation could not
by itself ensure educational opportunities for students who have historically
been denied such opportunities on the basis of race. This is the reason that the
strategy should have been, and should continue to be, a co-extensive fight for
equalization and true integration that includes holistic measures. 5 '
2. The Limits of a One-DimensionalRemedy
Related to the abandonment of a dual equalization-integration strategy in
favor of attacking only segregation, the resulting remedies ordered by the
Court failed to include measures that would help to address the core objective
ofBrown-to reduce the racial stigmatization inherent in the system of statesponsored racial segregation and discrimination. As the Court held, "[t]o

predominantly black schools at the expense of directly addressing the root causes of racial segregation and
discrimination cannot succeed. See Milliken I1, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); infra Part nl.C.2.
149. See supra Part II.C. (discussing current day school desegregation litigation).
150. Id.
151. See infra Part ll.C.2.

2005]

EDUCATIONAL EQUITY IN THE WAKE OF GRUTTER

separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be
undone."' 5 2 The desegregative remedies implemented in the wake of Brown
focused largely on eliminating the actual system of racially separate schools,
but failed to satisfactorily implement companion structures that might have
helped effectuate the dismantling of a deeply entrenched system of valuing
one race over another.. The equitable remedies used to repair the denial of the
constitutional right addressed in Brown did not effectively tackle the
underlying condition that so offended the Constitution in the first place. The
remedies ordered did not confront the stigmatic effect of racial segregation
referenced by the Court in the legendary footnote 11 of the Brown decision,'53
which-detailed the social and psychological effects of a racially segregated
education on minority children. Indeed, while the Court's denunciation of the
state-sponsored segregative system in the South led to a slow and sometimes
troubled dismantling of the legal structures of segregation, it did not result in
a remedy that addressed the issue of the stigmatic harm that centuries of white
supremacy wrought on black children, and on children of all races.'54 In
essence, the remedy ended state-sponsored segregation but failed to achieve
true integration.
True integration requires an end to the legal structure of apartheidplus an
institution of holistic measures to break down attitudes that linger from a
history of racial subordination. It addresses our hope for an inclusive society.
It requires instituting measures that also focus on helping students once they
are enrolled in desegregated schools.' This effort should include systemic
efforts to dismantle the structure of racial hegemony. To create a more
inclusive society, remedies must be as multifaceted as the problems they seek
to address. Such integrative remedies could include curricular innovations,
professional training, and non-academic opportunities designed to increase
meaningful cross-racial interaction among students and teachers.'5 6 The
failure to incorporate a holistic set of desegregative measures, beyond the

152. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
153. Id.at 494 n.lI.

154. As Professor John Charles Boger noted, racial segregation in schools worked a "terrible evil"
on white children as well. John Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety andthe
Resegregationof Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1719, 1794 (2000).

155. See, e.g., Moody, supra note 10, at 679, 709 (study concluding that cross-racial integration was
achieved mainly in desegregated schools that had additional opportunities for cross-racial interaction such
as extracurricular activities).
156. For a discussion of other examples of companion structures, see infra Part IV.A.
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simple racial balancing of schools, allowed for a system that, left unfettered,
actually served to reinforce a system of devaluing African-American students.
Certain specific tactics post-Brown reinforced patterns of racial
hegemony by placing the intolerable burden of integration on AfricanAmerican students. Such policies included the "freedom-of-choice" plans first
used to eradicate segregation, which placed the onus on black children to
voluntarily desegregate schools, and which were used to control the extent of
desegregation. 15 7 By 1968, the Court held that such plans were
unconstitutional because they placed an undue burden on African-American
students.158 Yet fourteen years of such plans had already buttressed the deeply
entrenched system of white supremacy by putting the responsibility for
meaningful racial integration on the backs of black schoolchildren, rather than
on the school districts themselves. Even after the Court's ruling in Green,
school districts continued to implement strategies to place the intolerable
burden of effectuating the Court's mandate on African-American children
through disproportionate transportation burdens.
Another set of policies that served to reinforce the racial hierarchy long
after the Court issued its desegregation mandate were the surreptitious
strategies used by intransigent Southern school districts to purge AfricanAmerican educators from public schools. In her survey of the effect of
desegregation on African-American teachers in the South, educator Mary
Hatwood Futrell identified a number of recurring practices. These practices
included (1) firing African-American teachers for exercising their political
rights or for joining the NAACP; (2) administering reprisals to those AfricanAmerican teachers who spoke out in favor of complying with desegregative
orders; (3) firing thousands of African-American teachers before districts
actually desegregated; (4) abolishing tenure laws where there were large
numbers of black educators, thus giving administrators the right to fire
teachers without cause; (5) dismissing teachers even with tenure laws in place
by hiring them outside of their certified field and then firing them for
incompetence; and (6) retaining white faculty while demoting or dismissing
black faculty.' 59 According to one report, by 1972, more than 41,600 AfricanAmerican educators in the southern states had been displaced or lost their

157. See, e.g., Mary Hatwood Futrell, The Impact of the Brown Decision on African American
Educators, in THE UNFINISHED AGENDA OFBROwN v. BOARD OFEDUCATION 79, 86-87 (Editors of BLACK
ISSUES N HIGHER EDUC. et al. eds., 2004).

158. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 490 (1968).
159. Futrell, supra note 157, at 86-87.
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jobs. 6 ° More than half of all black public school administrators were demoted
or dismissed. 6' Moreover, those black teachers who did desegregate
previously all-white schools usually found themselves in hostile environments
where some white teachers refused to even speak to them or questioned the
validity of their teaching credentials.'6 2 In addition, little professional
development training was provided to help acculturate black and white
students or teachers into the newly desegregated schools.'63
Policies that sadly were hallmarks of the post-Brown era, such as closing
previously all-black schools, placing disproportionate transportation burdens
on black children, and purging African-American teachers from schools, were
fundamentally designed to accommodate white students and teachers. The
long-term stigmatizing effects of these policies were highlighted by at least
one federal district court in the South years later. In one long-standing school
desegregation case," a federal district court judge in South Carolina noted
that closing African-American institutions would have the potential to further
the racial stigmatization that thrived under a system of state-sponsored
segregation. In that case, the court required the implementation of a magnet
program at a historically black high school, rather than closing the high school
altogether:
The District stigmatized [the high school] as an inferior black school. If the "nature of
the violation" was the District's discrimination against [the school], then the remedy
cannot be one that rewards the District by closing the school. To allow the District to
close the last remaining historically black secondary school in the county would be to
consummate, not remedy, the stigma and injury inflicted upon "the race disfavored by the
65
violation."'

Despite the Brown Court's intentions to provide black students with increased
opportunities, at least in the short run, the decision had the deleterious effect
of decimating a cadre of powerful academic role models for black and white
students. This helped to reinforce, rather than eradicate, the disequilibrium
wrought by the deeply entrenched American racial hierarchy.

160. Id.
at 89 (citing Samuel B. Ethridge, Impact of the 1954 Brown v. Topeka Board of Education
Decisionon Black Educators,4 NEGRo EDUC. REV. 30 (1979)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 88.
163. Id.
164. Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 1341 (D.S.C. 1995).
165. Id at 1388 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992)); see also Lee v. Autauga
County Bd. of Educ., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
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These remedies, purported to rectify the violation of constitutional rights
identified in Brown, were grounded in an idealistic assumption that a focus on
racial balancing in schools was sufficient without a corresponding frontal
attack on the deep-rooted notions of racial hierarchy inherent in our society.
In failing to order more holistic remedial measures, the courts allowed racial
prejudices that affected the hearts and minds of both black and white students
to persist. This made it exceedingly difficult for educators, policymakers, and
practitioners to have an honest dialogue about the harmful effects of the
deeply entrenched racial hegemony that persisted in schools long after the
legal structure of apartheid ended. In the absence of a frank discussion of the
need for a panoply of race-based reforms to address the harmful social and
psychological effects of racial segregation, the very language of racial stigma
has been co-opted by those who have sought an end to the precise remedies
aimed at eradicating the deleterious vestiges of state-sponsored racial
segregation and discrimination.' 66
Ultimately, as Justice Marshall opined in his Milliken dissent,
desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy task.'6 7 The failures
in the full implementation of Brown's mandate point to the idealism of the
lawyers who hoped that the long-arm of the Constitution, through the Court's
directive, would unalterably push the nation toward fundamental racial reform
and increased educational opportunities.
True racial integration,
unfortunately, entails more than the simple dismantling of the legal structures
that forced the separation of races. The failure to achieve this genuine
integration stems in part from the failure of courts to provide remedies for
constitutional violations, because they perceived such remedies as too difficult
to implement. Later, courts missed opportunities to address the vestiges of
segregation by treating intersecting issues, such as the relationship between
persistent residential segregation and the continued racial segregation in
public schools, as non-justiciable.' 6 8 The end result is that a half-century after

166. In the voting rights contexts, see, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 909-11 (1995); United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 746-47 (1995) (citing appellees' complaint that Louisiana's redistricting
scheme violated white voters' right to engage in a color-blind process); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,641-43
(1993) (pointing to language in appellants' complaint that North Carolina's redistricting scheme deprived
white voters of the right to participate in a color-blind election process).
167. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[N]eutral
policies, such as local school assignments, do not offend the Constitution when individual private choices
concerning work or residence produce schools with high black populations."). This is a departure from the
Court's holding in 1971 that planned segregation of schools led to segregated housing. Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971). See also Denton, supra note 77, at 801-06.
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Brown, we are still seeking some of the broad racial reforms that would
effectuate Brown's mandate.
IV. VOLUNTARY SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS AND THE FUTURE OF
RACIAL INCLUSION

In Brown, the Court reminded us that "education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments," in part because "[i]t is
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities.' ' 69 The
matter of school desegregation is really a microcosm of race relations in
broader society. For, as the Court acknowledged:
It is the very foundation of good citizenship .... [I]t is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.... [I]t
is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. 170

Schools are the places where children learn the values and skills that will take
them through the rest of their lives. It makes sense then that schools should
be the laboratories for the expurgation of the evils of segregation and racism
and for the embracing of racial tolerance. For those who believe in the
continued relevance of litigation as one of many tools for genuine social
change, and for those interested in creating and maintaining integrated
schools, some of the most promising avenues for success looking forward may
lie in the Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding race-conscious
policies in higher education, as well as in the opinions of lower courts
upholding voluntary integrative measures to create and maintain access to
equal educational opportunity.
While efforts to eliminate the legal structure of racial segregation and the
racial caste system that support it have fallen short, it is apparent that the
ideals put forth in Brown, when implemented by conscientious courts and
school districts, have yielded significant benefits for all students involved.
Efforts to end the practices that accompany racial segregation, including
inferior educational resources in terms of school facilities, books, technology,
and teachers, and to end the racial stigmatization of minority students that
facilitates the continued exclusion of minorities from mainstream society and

169. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
170. Id.
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opportunity structures, can best be accomplished by focusing both on
improving measures for true integration and providing students with the
necessary resources to obtain the best educational opportunities possible.
The critical challenge of the twenty-first century is to maximize the
successes of previous school desegregation litigation, without recreating or
perpetuating the flaws of the traditional one-dimensional integration strategy
and remedy. There are ways to trumpet the integrative ideal in public
education while also utilizing critical structures that emphasize equalization
and holistic remedies. Addressing such issues requires broad, complex
solutions, many, ifnot most, of which may not seem politically feasible. Yet,
even within existing institutional and political structures, there are certain
programs that make some strides toward increasing integration while
addressing some of the necessary structural remedies.
A. True Integration andEquality in Voluntary Race-ConsciousPrograms
In this vein, there are a number of school districts that have voluntarily
adopted race-conscious programs to try to correct the flaws in the traditional
desegregative strategy and in the one-dimensional remedy instituted in the
wake of Brown. As recent court rulings have lessened the scope of courtordered desegregative remedies, 7 ' voluntarily instituted policies and practices
provide avenues to address racial isolation and concentrations of poverty.'72
They combine true integrative policies with a corresponding focus on
resources. These policies have also been informed by the compelling interest
in remedying defacto educational and residential segregation.' 73
One useful example of such a policy is the voluntary desegregation
program adopted by the school district in the multiracial town of Lynn,
Massachusetts.' 74 The program uses holistic integrative measures with a

171. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237 (1991).
172. The Court's ruling in Milliken has made it very difficult to address urban-suburban segregation
absent a showing of an inter-district violation and, as such, some of the best hope for constitutional
jurisprudence to support integrative measures resides in the intra-district remedies that school districts have
voluntarily implemented.
173. Brewer v. W. lrondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding "that a
compelling interest can be found in a program that has as its object the reduction of racial isolation and
what appears to be defacto segregation"); see also Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 263 F. Supp. 2d 209,
264, 266 (D. Mass. 2003), amended by 283 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2003), and affden banc, 418 F.2d
1 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that a school district had a compelling interest in ameliorating the effects of de
facto residential segregation).
174. See Comfort, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 213, 215.
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corresponding focus on expenditures in a way that has not been done in many
The program looks at equity and
traditional desegregation plans.
desegregation, while also looking to the quality of desegregation. As
discussed earlier, Professor Bell has cautioned that the desegregation process
is successful only when it does not ultimately disrupt the dominant racial
power structure.175 But the race-conscious program voluntarily adopted by the
Lynn district actually attempts to alter the racial hierarchy, because it looks
to racial balancing as well as the quality of interaction between students of
different races. Such attention to detail in schools and classrooms addresses
a deficiency in most previous desegregation plans.
The Lynn school district's student assignment plan carefully includes
holistic measures to address the issue of racial tolerance. The plan's drafters
"recognized that integration involves more than race-conscious school
assignment policies, more than simply the mixing of students of different
racial backgrounds."' 176 In voluntarily addressing the flawed remedial patterns
of Brown that reinforced racial stigma, the plan includes a number of holistic
integrative measures, including
substantial curricular innovations designed to ensure positive racial interaction; training
and development of staff to address the challenges of teaching children of diverse
backgrounds; programs that would create opportunities for positive interaction among
students, school personnel and parents from different racial and ethnic groups ...; [and]
integrated leadership opportunities and training to give students the skills necessary to
177
deal effectively with racial tension and conflict .

Moreover, the plan combines these integrative remedies with expenditures to
improve physical facilities and to develop and standardize curricular
offerings. 7 ' Such models may prove the most effective tools for achieving
true integration, and may also elicit less criticism because they combine the
consideration of race with many other equally essential factors leading to
increased educational opportunities for all children. Moreover, the Lynn,
Massachusetts plan explicitly addresses the ideal of integration and the
necessity for the provision of adequate179institutional resources in the face of
entrenched, systemic racial inequities.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

BELL, CovENANTs, supranote 105, at 49-58.
Comfort, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
Id.

Id.
Id.at 229-30.
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In recent years, parents of white students have challenged some voluntary
race-conscious policies on the ground that they violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The central question in these cases is
whether the voluntary use of race to assign or admit students to public school
satisfies a compelling state interest. 80 Parents of elementary school children
in Lynn challenged the school district's voluntary use of race in permitting
student transfers. The Plan withstood constitutional challenge at the district
court and appellate levels.' 8 '
Significantly, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the use of race in a
voluntary integration policy at the elementary or secondary level. Yet, several
recent lower court rulings have sustained such policies in the face of
constitutional attacks.'8 2 Given the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence
upholding the constitutionality of race-conscious policies in higher education,
such voluntary school desegregation plans at the elementary and secondary
level may provide the positive models for taking the Court's ruling in Brown
a step closer to achieving equality of educational opportunity.' 8 3 As two lower
courts have recently reached different conclusions in evaluating the
constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious plans at the K-12 level in the
wake of Grutter, this issue will likely reach the Supreme Court in the future.
I argue that Grutter provides a positive tool for upholding race-conscious
policies at the K- 12 level, because it is arguably the best and most important
place to seek racial inclusion.

180. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999); Wessman v.
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
181. The case is currently on appeal.
182. See, e.g., Brewer, 212 F.3d 738; Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
1999); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004); Comfort, 263 F.
Supp. 2d 209.
183. Though beyond the scope of this paper, the impact of ballot initiatives like Proposition 209 in
California and Initiative 200 in Washington State, which both ban racial discrimination and "preferential
treatment" in the operation of public education, adds an interesting level of complexity to the role of
voluntary race-conscious programs in public education. Proposition 209 (amending CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 31 (1996)); Initiative 200 (amending WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1998)). Yet, in Washington, the
state supreme court upheld the use of such policies on the grounds that they did not constitute a racial
preference. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003). The
court held that such policies (1) did not promote a less qualified minority applicant over a more qualified
applicant; (2) applied equally to members of all races; and (3) furthered a core mission of public education.
Id. at 166. For further discussion of Seattle's race-conscious program, see infra Part IV.B.3.

2005]

EDUCATIONAL EQUITY IN THE WAKE OF GRUTTER

B. Supporting Voluntary DesegregationPlans Under Grutter
In June 2003, the Supreme Court may have issued its most revolutionary
statement on race and the importance of racial inclusion in the last thirty
years. In Grutterv. Bollinger,a white plaintiff challenged the use of race as
one of many factors in determining admissions to the University of Michigan
Law School.' 84 Using a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court upheld the use of
race as a factor in furtherance of the compelling government interest of
increasing student body diversity, and held that the Law School's admissions
policy was sufficiently narrowly tailored to further that interest. 85 While this
case specifically addressed the use of race in affirmative action policies in
institutions of higher education, it may also help school districts defend raceconscious practices aimed at fostering diverse student bodies at the elementary
and secondary levels. Grutteris a positive sign in what has been a negative
landscape. Therefore, advocates should capitalize on the Court's willingness
to consider race in the educational setting.
First, the Court quoted directly from the Brown ruling in reaching its
decision that "'education... is the very foundation of good citizenship."' 86 In
this way, Grutterrepresents a vehicle to use integrative policies to create and
maintain access to equal educational opportunity at all levels. As in Brown,
the Court in Grutteralso recognized that education has the important social
purpose of helping people function effectively in a democratic society.'8 7
Second, the Court acknowledged the continued salience of race in our
society' and the need for policies to address inequalities. The Court
acknowledged arguments regarding the continuing struggle for racial

184. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 3 16-17 (2003).
185. Id.at 343-44. In the companion case, the Supreme Court struck down the admissions policy
of the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts on narrow tailoring grounds.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
186. Grutter,539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)). The Court
referenced the spirit of Brown in emphasizing that "[e]ffective participation by members of all racial and
ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be
realized." Id.at 332.
187. Just as the Court fifty years ago acknowledged that a sound education is required in the
performance of all basic public responsibilities, including the armed forces, Brown, 347 U.S. at 493, the
Court in Grutternoted the necessity of successful integration for the American economic system and for
national security. Grutter,539 U.S. at 330-31. ("[M]ajor American businesses haye made clear that the
skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.... To fulfill its mission, the military 'must... train and
educate a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse setting."').
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equality."'8 In addressing the continued need for race-conscious policies, the
Court helped to reverse the trend that assumes a moral equivalence between
the legacy of racial segregation and the use of race today to dismantle that
legacy.'89
Looking forward, the realm of school desegregation jurisprudence may
be further shaped by courts' applications of a Grutter analysis to determine
the constitutionality ofvoluntary race-conscious programs in public education
that are increasingly under attack. 9 ' The Court's decision in Gruttergives a
boost to advocates for the preservation of integrative remedies as a means for
increasing educational opportunities at all levels.
1. The Concept of CriticalMass
In Grutter,the Court decried the practice of racial balancing "for its own
sake," stating that such a practice would be "patently unconstitutional."19 '
The Court cited its 1992 opinion in Pitts,which addressed the factors to be
considered in releasing a school district from a court-ordered desegregation
plan. Yet, the true origin of the Court's language on this point is instructive.
The Pitts language cited in Grutterfor the proposition that racial balancing for
its own sake is unconstitutional was first stated in the Court's 1971 opinion

188. See, e.g., Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and the American
Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241), in 5 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 149 (2003). The GrutterCourt recognized that there is a
"unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still
matters." Grutter,539 U.S. at 333.
189. As Professor Randall Kennedy eloquently stated:
In the forties, fifties, and early sixties.... it seemed that racial subjugation could be overcome by
mandating the application of race-blind law ....The opponents of affirmative action have stripped
the historical context from the demand for race-blind law. They have fashioned this demand into
a new totem and insist on deference to it no matter what its effects upon the very group the
fourteenth amendment was created to protect. Brown and its progeny do not stand for the abstract
principle that [all] governmental distinctions based on race are unconstitutional. Rather, [they] ...
stand for the proposition that the Constitution prohibits any arrangements imposing racial
subjugation-whether such arrangements are ostensibly race-neutral or even ostensibly race-blind.
Randall Kennedy, PersuasionandDistrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L.
REv. 1327, 1335-36 (1986) (citations omitted); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Casefor RaceConsciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060 (1991).
190. While there are a number of different types of such programs, this Section focuses on the
voluntary use of traditional intra-district race-conscious programs in public schools. Although the analysis
could be applied to other types of race-conscious programs, such as magnet and charter schools, I will save
such a discussion for a future paper.
191. Grutter,539 U.S. at 329-30 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,494 (1992) ("Racial balance
is not to be achieved for its own sake.")).
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in Swann. 9 2 Read more fully, the language in Swann provides the Court's
clearest pronouncement as to the constitutionalityof voluntary race-conscious
student assignment plans in the K-12 context. In Swann, the Court noted that:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement
educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare
students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of
Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole.' 93

The Court further held that, while a federal court lacks the authority to order
such a policy "absent a finding of a constitutional violation," it "is within the
broad discretionary powers of school authorities" to look at race in assigning
students to schools as a matter of educational policy.'94 Thus, the Court's
language in Swann suggests it is within a school district's broad discretion to
voluntarily use racial balancing as an educational policy. Under Swann, the
Court suggested that a school district may choose to adopt such a policy to
"prepare students to live in a pluralistic society. ' ' 5
In Grutter, the Court reached a similar point in its discussion of the
concept of garnering a "critical mass" of minority students, which it tied to the
compelling state interest of the "educational benefits that diversity is designed
to produce."' 6 As in Grutter,voluntary race-conscious student assignment
plans in elementary and secondary schools do not constitute racial balancing
"for its own sake" rather, it is a school district's voluntary consideration of
race in assigning students for the purposes of producing educational benefits
tied to diversity. In the case of these programs, such benefits include the
reasoning set forth in Swann more than 30 years ago. These programs
continue to help "prepare students to live in a pluralistic society. ' '

192. See Pitts, 503 U.S. at 494 (citing Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
31-32 (1971)).
193. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Grutter,539 U.S. at 330.
197. It is worth noting that the only other context of"unconstitutional" racial balancing that the Court
has referenced is in its ruling in City ofRichmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). This is
arguably inapposite, as the case addressed the constitutionality of affirmative action in contracting and has
no relation to education.
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2. The Compelling Interest in Racial Integration
In Grutter,the Court used the strict scrutiny test to determine whether the
use of race in a law school admissions policy furthered a compelling
government interest and whether the admissions policy was sufficiently
narrowly tailored to further that interest. The Court found that the use of race
to further student body diversity served a compelling government interest.
School districts' voluntary use of race-conscious plans also serves this
compelling interest. Indeed, the context of K- 12 education arguably presents
an even more compelling case for racial inclusion and provides an arena in
which courts have historically given great deference to the choices of local
districts to effectuate educational policy.
One of the most crucial lessons to emerge from Grutter is that courts
applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications must attune their inquiries to
the context of the race-conscious action.' 98 Beyond whatever doctrinal shift
in education law that Gruttermay portend more broadly, the context of K-12
public education provides a particularly compelling argument for the necessity
of integrative measures. As one lower court opined, "[d]iversity may well be
more important at this stage than at any other-[because elementary school]
is when first friendships are formed and important attitudes shaped...."' At
the earliest stages of education, the shadow of racism has had less time to
hover. Even Justice Scalia in his Grutter dissent suggested cross-racial
understanding falls under the purview of elementary education.2"' Scalia's
comment shows support from an unexpected place and further buttresses the
argument that the most important arena in which to address issues of racial
isolation is elementary and secondary education.

198. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection
Clause.... Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is
designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the
reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context.
(citations omitted).
199. Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247, 259 (D. Mass. 1999).
200. In his dissent, Scalia noted that "[t]he educational benefit.. .of cross-racial understanding and
better prep[aration of] students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society [is] .. .essentially the
same lesson taught to ... people three feet shorter and twenty years younger than the full-grown adults at
the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school
kindergartens." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations and quotations omitted).
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Public elementary and secondary schools have the unique role of
imparting civic values to students at a critical age. In a number of public
education cases, the Supreme Court has noted that the fundamental goal of
elementary and secondary education is to prepare children to be good citizens,
which includes instilling civic values and developing strong social skills.20 '
In the realm of elementary and secondary education, courts have long noted
that the benefits of integrated systems have the ability to take root with
younger children, and thus may be even more critical at this stage. As Judge
Waties Waring powerfully stated in his dissent in the district court decision
of the South Carolina companion case .toBrown:
There is absolutely no reasonable explanation for racial prejudice. It is all caused by
unreasoning emotional reactions and these are gained in early childhood. Let the little
child's mind be poisoned by prejudice of this kind and it is practically impossible to
remove these impressions however many years he may have of teaching by philosophers,
religious leaders or patriotic citizens. If segregation is wrong, then the place to stop it
is in the first grade and not in graduate colleges. 2

Moreover, as discussed earlier,2 3 we have a significant body of social science
research accepted by courts2"° that shows the educational benefits of racially
integrated systems of education.2 5 Increased opportunities for cross-racial
interaction at the elementary and secondary levels teach students civic values,
produce strong social skills, and are pivotal to proper engagement in the
democratic and political process.
In addition to a compelling interest in racial diversity at the K- 12 level
that is as strong or stronger than the interest expressed in Grutter, the Grutter
Court also exhibited deference to educational institutions' choices in
evaluating whether the use of race furthered a compelling government interest.
201. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 221-23 (1982) (noting that public education perpetuates the political system and the economic and
social advancement of citizens); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979) (observing that public
schools convey to children "the values on which our society rests," including "fundamental values necessary
to the maintenance of a democratic political system").
202. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 547 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (Waring, J., dissenting).
203. See supra Part II.B.
204. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 263 F. Supp. 2d 209, 234-38. See also Grutter,539
U.S. at 330.
205. In a sense, this evidence that all students benefit from racial integration may represent the
triumph of a part of Derrick Bell's interest-convergence theory. As discussed earlier, Bell has argued that
racial progress only occurs when policymakers perceive that such action will benefit the nation's interest
and will not significantly diminish whites' sense of entitlement. BELL, COVENANTS, supra note 104, at 9.
The interest-convergence at work in the K- 12 realm is that research shows that racial integration in schools
benefits all children and, ultimately, helps to build a stronger democracy.
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Similarly, in the K-12 realm, courts have shown deference to local school
districts' efforts to fashion educational policies. The basis for such deference
in the K- 12 model is different than in the case of university admissions, where
the Court reaffirmed the notion that academic freedom rooted in the First
Amendment supported some deference to the university.20 6 Nonetheless, the
Grutter Court's explicit deference to defendants on the legal question of
whether diversity serves a compelling government interest in the context of
the challenged program 2°7 suggests that the principles of local control that the
Court has long held to be essential in crafting K- 12 educational policy would
allow for a similarly deferential strict scrutiny analysis.
In previous decisions that struck down court-ordered race-conscious
remedies in education, such as Milliken20 ' and Pitts, 0 9 the Supreme Court
strongly sanctioned the role and significance of local elected school boards in
fashioning educational policies for their communities.2 10 Such decisions
suggest the Court should be similarly deferential to local authorities' abilities
to voluntarily implement and maintain desegregative plans designed to address
diversity within the borders of their particular school district.2 " Recently,

206. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
207. Id.
208. In Milliken, the Court struck down an inter-district remedy and allowed segregated schools to
persist, based on the legal rationale that "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeplyrooted than
local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the
maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to [the] quality of the educational
process." Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
209. In Pitts, the Court noted:
As we have long observed, "local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition."
Returning schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential to
restore their true accountability in our governmental system. When the school district and all state
entities participating with it in operating the schools make decisions in the absence of judicial
supervision, they can be held accountable to the citizenry, to the political process, and to the courts
in the ordinary course.
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (citation omitted); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237, 248 (1991) ("Local control over the education of children allows citizens to participate in
decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit local needs."); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) ("Remedial judicial authority does not put judges
automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only
when local authority defaults."); Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) ("School authorities have the primary
responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems .... ).
210. See cases cited supra note 209; see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457,
481-82 (1982); Dayton Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,410 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-51 (1973).
211. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit remarked long ago,
[i]t is the wiser course to allow for the flexibility, imagination and creativity of local school boards
in providing for equal opportunity in education for all students.... [T]here may be a variety of
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some district courts have used local control principles in a positive manner to
support districts' voluntary desegregation policies.2 12 As one district court
noted in upholding a voluntary desegregation policy:
As many school systems escape the mandate of desegregation decrees, they face for the
first time a choice of direction. It would seem rather odd that the concepts of equal
protection, local control and limited deference are now only one-way streets to a
virtually prohibiting the voluntary continuation of policies
particular education policy,
213
once required by law.

There may be a more progressive model of local control emerging, embedded
in the recent rulings upholding voluntary school desegregation measures in
K-12 education.
3. Narrowly TailoredK-12 Voluntary DesegregationPlans
The Court's narrow tailoring analysis in Grutter suggests that most
voluntary race-conscious plans should survive such an analysis.214 While the
contextual differences between K-12 race-conscious policies and higher
education race-conscious policies are even more acute in a narrow tailoring
analysis, the Court's willingness to uphold such policies at the higher
education level suggests that voluntary measures should endure. Unlike
colleges and universities, American K- 12 public education has a tradition of
compulsory assignment." 5 Therefore, the relevant context at the K-12 level
is compulsory student assignment plans rather than selective "merit"-driven
university admissions policies.21 6 In the context of university admissions, a
common argument of those who have sought to dismantle race-conscious
admissions policies is that affirmative action policies value race over

permissible means to the goal of equal opportunity, and that room for reasonable men of good will
to solve these complex community problems must be preserved.
Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 61 (6th Cir. 1966).
212. It should be noted that the policies discussed here are intra-district remedies. Such policies do
not address the type of inter-district remedy that the Court found unconstitutional in Milliken in the absence
of a showing of an inter-district violation.
213. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 851 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
214. Professor Wendy Parker notes that courts have historically provided only a cursory analysis of
the narrow tailoring test in desegregation cases. Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School
Desegregation,and Federalism,45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1691, 1740 (2004).
215. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986) (White, J., concurring).
216. See Boger,supranote 154, at 1777-80 (discussing the lack ofindividualized assessment in K-1 2

assignment policies, as opposed to the higher education context).
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"merit"'217 in the distribution of a finite number of seats at colleges and
universities. In the context of traditional intra-district public student
assignment plans, there is no such individualized assessment of "merit,"
because all students will be assigned to a school in the district and in most
instances are offered equivalent alternate education at another public school
within the district. In the K-12 context, unlike college and university
admissions, no student will be denied the opportunity of an education in the
district. Thus, in the milieu of compulsory student assignment plans, the
consideration of race does not result in the denial of the benefit of public
education within a school district. Courts should take this distinction into
consideration when determining whether such plans are sufficiently narrowly
tailored to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
In addition, with respect to a narrow tailoring analysis of K- 12 voluntary
race-conscious student assignment plans, school districts need wide latitude
in fashioning policies to increase educational opportunity because of the
persistence of residential segregation that thwarts efforts to achieve significant
racial diversity absent implementation of race-conscious public assignment
policies.2 1 As discussed earlier, the need for racial diversity is arguably even
more critical at the K- 12 level than at the higher education level.
In Grutter, the Court looked to a number of factors to determine whether
the use of race in admissions was sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. These factors include: whether the plan
allows for an individualized assessment of each student; whether the plan is
sufficiently flexible; whether the plan places too heavy a burden on nonminority applicants; whether the institution has considered race-neutral
alternatives; and whether the plan has any time limits.2 1 9 There are a number
of areas in which the Grutter narrow tailoring analysis, as applied to K-12
voluntary desegregation plans, supports the broad majority of voluntary
desegregation plans.
First, the Court in Grutter looked to whether the use of affirmative action
in a higher education institution's admissions policy allowed for a sufficiently
individualized assessment of each student, such that it was narrowly tailored
to further the compelling state interest in pursuing racial diversity. In most

217. There is, of course, a lively current debate as to what constitutes "merit" in the educational
context. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as PoliticalActs: Guardiansat the Gates of Our
DemocraticIdeals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113 (2003).
218. See, e.g., Powell& Spencer, supra note 139, at 343; Boger, supranote 154, at 1726-27; Denton,
supra note 77.
219. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-44 (2003).
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K-12 voluntary desegregation plans, race is also used as one factor in
Such plans may provide for an
determining student assignments.
individualized assessment of each student prior to assigning him or her to a
school for purposes of furthering racial diversity at one school or another. In
the case of McFarlandv. Jefferson County Public Schools, for example, the
largest school district in Kentucky operates a "managed choice" system aimed
at ending racial isolation.22 0 The system considers many factors other than
race, including need, school size, and parental preference, before assigning
students to schools.2"2' McFarlandrepresents the first major federal district
court case to argue the constitutionality of race-conscious assignment
programs in public education since Grutter,and the plan was upheld by the
district court.222 Moreover, many ofthe concerns that have motivated the need
for individualized assessment in competitive admissions policies are simply
not present in the context of non-competitive transfer policies in public
elementary and secondary schools.2".
Second, the Court in Grutterheld that a university's admissions program
must be flexible and cannot use a quota system.22 4 Race-conscious assignment
programs in public education are flexible in that they usually provide a range
for the racial diversity that the districts seek to achieve in plans. This range
is analogous to the Court's definition of"critical mass" in the Grutteropinion.
In that case, while there were no numbers assigned to the term "critical mass,"
it was agreed that minority student admissions generally fell within a
particular range. The Court noted "there is of course some relationship
between numbers and . ..providing a reasonable environment for those
students admitted. Some attention to numbers, without more, does not
'
The Court noted
transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota."225
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222. Id. But see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir.
2004) (striking down a voluntary race-conscious K-12 plan on narrow tailoring grounds), discussed infra.
223. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding no need for
individualized assessment in K- 12 transfer policies).
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226. Id.Moreover, race-conscious assignment programs in public education provide flexibility in
allowing for further review in policies such as hardship assessments. Such assessments may be provided
for students who prefer to attend a school in which they would not contribute to the racial diversity but
where to attend another school would provide an undue hardship on the student and family. See, e.g.,
Comfort, 418 F.3d at 8, 9.
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In the context of voluntary race-conscious assignment plans at the K- 12
level, a desegregative policy that allows for a range of racial diversity in a
school may assign students to one school or another that is not their first
choice, or their neighborhood school, because to do otherwise would not result
in the critical mass of minority to majority students that the district seeks in
each school. All other things being equal-after an individualized assessment
may allow for an examination of any pertinent non-race factors-race may
ultimately be used as the deciding factor in a school assignment decision.
The Court in Grutter also analyzed the burden that race-conscious
policies may have on non-minority students. In the context of voluntary
desegregation plans in public education, any potential burden placed on nonminority students is significantly less than that imposed by an admissions
policy allocating a finite number of seats to students at a selective college or
university. As stated earlier, all students receive an adequate education within
the public school system. In the case of traditional public schools,227 the
goods are fungible.2 2 As such, the plans place no discernible burden on nonminority students in the way that the Court held such a burden might be placed
on the non-minority student in the context of an affirmative action policy in
higher education admissions.
While the final considerations in the Grutter narrow tailoring
analysis-consideration of race-neutral alternatives and time limits-may still
apply, the full exploration of race-neutral alternatives should also be
considered in the context of the compelling government interest in decreasing
racial isolation in K- 12 public education and the greater deference that courts
give to defendants in such a context. In the milieu of higher education, the
consideration of race-neutral alternatives in admissions was arguably more
necessary because of the greater burden placed on non-minority students in
such instances. In the context of race-conscious assignment policies in public
education, no student is being denied the benefit of an education in the school
district. Consequently, the consideration of race-neutral alternatives need not
be as exhaustive as in the higher education admissions context.
In the wake of the Grutterdecision, the Western District of Kentucky was
the first district court to examine the constitutionality of voluntary integration
plans in K-12 schools based on the framework provided in Grutter. In the
case of McFarland, the Western District of Kentucky upheld a school
227. This is a different context than the Boston Latin School at issue in Wessmann v. Gittens, 160
F.3d 790 (1 st Cir. 1998), which all parties conceded provided a distinctly different educational experience
than the other public schools in the district.
228. See, e.g., Comfort, 418 F.3d 1.
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district's voluntary consideration of race in making student assignments to
achieve racial integration in its schools. 229 The court accepted the Board's
arguments that the plan served the compelling interest of improving the
educational experiences of its students, that integration had produced
educational benefits for students of all races over the past twenty-five years,
and that it had helped to overcome the adverse effects of concentrations of
poverty that disproportionately impacted African-American students.2 " The
Court held that the policy was also sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve
this goal. 3
Yet, appellate courts have been split in their interpretation of voluntary
school desegregation plans in the wake of Grutter. In a recent en banc ruling,
the First Circuit upheld the Lynn, Massachusetts voluntary desegregation plan.
Utilizing the Grutter framework, the court found that Lynn had a "compelling
interest in securing the educational benefits of diversity," and that the plan
was "narrowly tailored to meet this compelling interest., 232 Yet, a recent
decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals striking down a voluntary
school desegregation plan provides a cautionary tale. In Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, a group of white parents
challenged the Seattle school district's voluntary use of a racial tiebreaker in
a student assignment plan. 233 The court's ruling marked the first time a federal
appellate court has evaluated a voluntary public school desegregation plan at
the K-12 level since the Supreme Court's ruling in Grutter. In the Seattle
case, the court struck down the desegregation policy under the narrow
tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test.2 34 It held that the district's use of a
racial tiebreaker in assigning students to oversubscribed schools did not
provide a sufficiently individualized review of each student.235 The Seattle
case offers an instructive example of why the Grutter analytical framework
should be applied to K-12 plans with an understanding of the unique context
of such plans. In the case of the Seattle plan, the court's narrow tailoring
analysis failed to account for the more subtle nuances of the voluntary
assignment policies. Rather, the court supported its argument that racial
tiebreakers in K- 12 voluntary student assignment plans are unconstitutional
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quotas by drawing from jurisprudence from the merit-driven context of higher
education and from voting rights and contracting decisions.236 But, as
discussed above, the Grutter Court upheld a university admissions policy that
arguably used race in a similar manner.237 Moreover, as Judge Graber noted
in her dissent, such policies should be viewed in light of other Supreme Court
jurisprudence granting public school, districts authority to avoid racial
segregation.23 s
CONCLUSION

The limits of traditional desegregation strategies and remedies do not
negate the powerful and well-documented benefits of racial integration for
students of all races. Yet, historic practices that attacked segregation without
a corresponding push for equality of resources led to remedies that too often
addressed the symptoms of racial segregation and discrimination-racially
separate student bodies-without addressing the underlying root causes. The
fundamental flaws of the one-dimensional strategy and remedy helped to
perpetuate some racially discriminatory practices in public education. By
effectuating policies that seek both true integration, including holistic
measures that facilitate cross-racial interaction, as well as a corresponding
equality of resources, advocates and policymakers can build upon the
successes of the past while also trying to avoid some of the failures. Through
instituting voluntary race-conscious programs, school districts may design
remedies that effectuate equality and racial inclusion. Such policies should
be viewed even more positively in light of the Supreme Court's most recent
positive pronouncement about the benefits of racial integration in education.
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237. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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